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INTRODUCTION 
On July 17, 2017, the Counties brought a declaratory action asserting eleven (II) 
causes of action that challenge the constitutionality of Utah Code sections 59-2-201(4) 
("Valuation Law"), 59-2-804 ("Allocation Law"), and 59-2-1 007(2)(b) ("Review 
Threshold Law") (collectively, the "Challenged Laws"), on the basis the Challenged Laws 
lack uniformity and violate equal protection. Namely, whether independently or 
collectively the laws violate (I) the Utah Constitution's (a) uniformity and fair market 
value clauses for property tax valuations and assessments (Utah Const. Art. XIII, section 
2); (b) separation of powers and delegation of assessment authority clauses (Utah Const. 
Art. V, section I; Utah Const. Art. XIII, section 6); and (c) uniform operation of laws 
clauses (Utah Const. Art. I, section 24); and (2) the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. (R. 1-30). 
The State of Utah ("State"), Delta Airlines, Inc. and Sky West, Inc.("Airlines") 
(collectively "Appellees") sought dismissal of the Counties' constitutional claims arguing 
they were unripe and/or the Counties failed to exhaust administrative remedies with the 
Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commission"). (R. 282-295; R. 562-587). Granting 
the Appellees' motions, the district court acknowledged long standing precedent that the 
Tax Commission lacks authority to rule on the constitutionality of a statute. (R. 913-914, 
citing Tax Comm 'n v. Wright, 596 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1979)). The district court also ruled 
that because the Counties' had affirmatively challenged the Tax Commission's use of the 
Valuation and Allocation Laws in 2017 those claims were ripe for judicial review. (R. 912). 
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The district court, however, dismissed the Review Threshold Law causes of action 
as unripe because the Counties had not alleged that they had appealed a valuation 
determination with the Tax Commission that was subsequently rejected because a County 
or Counties did not meet the 50% or more undervaluation threshold needed to invoke the 
Tax Commission's jurisdiction. (R.912-913). The district court also dismissed the 
Counties' remaining causes of action in sweeping fashion for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies. (R. 913-915). This appeal follows. (R. 917-920).1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue #1: The Review Threshold Law found at Utah Code section 59-2-1007(2)(b), 
is facially unconstitutional and belies principles of uniformity. What is more, the law 
insulates certain airline tax assessments from judicial review unless the assessed value of 
airline property falls below the 50% threshold mandated by the Legislature as a predicate 
for invoking the Tax Commission's jurisdiction. (R. 366-371; R. 645-647; 650; R. 750-
783; R. 803-809; R. 941-946; R 963). Missing those points, the district court erred when 
it dismissed as unripe the Counties' uniformity challenge to the Review Threshold Law, 
because no Cotmty had first exhausted an appeal before the Tax Commission for which the 
Tax Commission would lack the jurisdiction to consider. I d. 
Standard of Review: "A district court's grant of a motion to distniss based upon 
the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint presents a question of law that we review for 
1 For purposes of this appeal, the Counties have not challenged the dismissal of the 
Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Claims for Relief dismissed by the district court in its 
Ruling and Order entered June 22,2018 (R. 908-916.). 
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correc1ness." Osguthorpe v. WolfMt. Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29, ~ 10,232 P.3d 999 (Utah 
20 10). Jurisdictional questions, such as subject matter jurisdiction, are reviewed for 
correctness. Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ., 2014 UT 27, ~8, 332 P.3d 922 (Utah 2014) 
(citing Canfield v. Layton Cty., 2005 UT 60, ~10, 122 P.3d 622 (Utah 2005)). 
Issue #2: A party seeking judicial review must exhaust its administrative remedies 
unless a party raises a purely legal question that cannot be finally determined in an 
administrative proceeding. (R.642-705; R. 750-783; R. 803-809; R. 963-973). Here, the 
Tax Commission lacks jurisdiction to resolve questions that challenge the constitutionality 
of a legislative enactment. !d. Misapplying this principle, the district court erred when it 
dismissed the Counties' First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh causes of 
action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies where the Counties' challenges to the 
constitutionality of Utah Code §§ 59-2-201( 4) and 59-2-804, neither can be decided by nor 
depend upon action taken by the Tax Commission. 
Standard of Review: A reviewing court will affirm a judgment on the pleadings 
only if, as a matter of law, the nonmoving party could not prevail under the facts alleged. 
Therefore, an appellate court gives such a ruling no deference and reviews it for 
correctness. Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897 (Utah 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND SUMMARY OF THE COUNTIES' 
ALLEGATIONS, CLAIMS AND ARGUMENT 
This appeal challenges the validity oflegislative action contained in the Challenged 
Laws, Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-201(4), 59-2-804 and 59-2-1007(2)(b), that usurps 
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constitutional mandates of uniformity and equality for airline property assessment. (R. 1-
30). Stated differently, this appeal challenges a set of tax laws that single out the airline 
industry for favorable treatment and intrude upon the Utah's Constitution's mandate that 
tax laws apply uniformly and equally to all Utah taxpayers. Id. Additionally, this appeal 
challenges whether in enacting the Challenged Laws, the Legislature unlawfully impaired 
and abated meaningful review of many airline assessments. 
Succinctly, the purely constitutional challenges on appeal are: 
Constitutional Uniformity Violations: 
1. The Valuation Law's implementation of the clear and convincing standard violates 
uniformity by requiring a different evidentiary standard for airlines' assessments. 
(R. 20-21 at '1['1[83-86). 
2. The Valuation Law's mandatory discount violates uniformity because it provides a 
discount only for those taxpayers who own three or more aircraft, but not to those 
who own two or own multiple items of property. (R. 22-23 at '1['1[94- 101). 
3. The Allocation Law's mandatory allocation factor violates uniformity because it 
results in an allocation of property less than 100% while other property allocations 
for property other than airline property use factors that equal 100%. (R.25-26 at '11'11 
112- 115). 
4. The Review Threshold Law violates uniformity by insulating Commission 
assessments of airline property from review that are believed to be less than fair 
market value from review. (R. 27 at '1['1[123-124). 
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Violation of Separation of Powers: 
5. The Valuation Law improperly allocates the authority to value airline property-
exclusively an executive function-to the Legislature. (R. 25 at~~ 108-111 ). 
De Facto Exemption Violation: 
6. The allocation factor in the Allocation Law acts as a defacto property tax exemption 
which may only be done by constitutional amendment. (R. 26 at~~ 116- 119). 
Equal Protection Violation: 
7. Utah Code Sections 59-2-201(4), 59-2-804, 59-2-1007(2)(b) violate state and 
federal equal protection guarantee. (R. 27 at~ 125). 
Diversely, this case is not a "property tax appeal" and it does not challenge the 
assessed value of any airline. (R. 1-30). As such it is not dependent upon any specific 
assessment of under-valued airline property that would make the Counties' claims subject 
to administrative exhaustion. Id. Rather, the constitutional questions ask whether the 
Legislature possessed authority to usurp the constitutional mandates of mliformity in 
taxation, to intrude upon the separation of powers, and to upset the balance created under 
the equal protection prongs of Utah Constitution Article I, section 24; Article V; and 
Article XIII, section (2)(1) to allow the airline industry to benefit from non-unifornlity and 
un-equalization through receiving statutory standards and treatment that no other Utah 
taxpayers receive. I d. 
The district court, however, erroneously dismissed, wholesale, the Counties' causes 
of action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies without conducting a separate 
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analysis as to each independently and alternatively pled claim. (R. 913-915). On appeal, 
the Counties postulate that a court may not grant dismissal in wholesale to all claims when 
a party has independently pled claims that give rise to purely legal questions that cannot be 
obviated through administrative adjudication and for which adjudication serves no useful 
purpose. 
Equally erroneous, the district court also dismissed the Review Threshold Law 
causes of action as unripe, fmding the complaint failed to specify concrete action by the 
Commission-as opposed to the language on the face of the statute itself-that deprived 
the Counties of an opportunity to pursue an appeal of a specific airline assessment. (R. 911-
913). The district court's holding misses the point of the Counties' unconstitutional 
challenge to the Review Threshold Law. The Review Threshold Law found at Utah Code 
Section 59-2-1007(2)(b) inherently belies principles of uniformity by insulating tax 
assessments from judicial review unless the assessed value falls below the 50% threshold 
mandated by the Legislature as a predicate for invoking the Tax Commission's jurisdiction. 
Therefore, it is the certainty of the statutory rule's deprivation of administrative review that 
violates the Utah Constitution. 
The district court's Ruling appears fundamentally to misapprehend the Counties' 
claims and causes of action for declaratory relief. (R. 1-30). Instead, there is simply no 
administrative remedy that will resolve or prove useful to detennine the constitutional 
challenges. (R.642-705). Nor are the legislative enactments that have long since been 
adopted and implemented by State actors somehow not "ripe" for judicial review. (R. 356-
6 
372; R. 803-809.) Accordingly, the district court's Ruling and Order dismissing the 
Counties' causes of action should be reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court 
for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
The Legislature has created an unconstitutional tax scheme for Airlines that should 
and must be stricken. The Challenged Laws expressly establish formal classifications and 
statutory methodologies that are non-uniform, and extinguish the Counties' right to redress 
the attendant injuries to their resident taxpayers. (R. 1-30). Despite the purely 
constitutional nature of the claims, the Counties' causes of action were erroneously 
dismissed by the district court on June 22,2018. (R. 908-916.) 
Specifically, the district court dismissed as umipe the Counties' Ninth and Tenth 
Claims for Relief because the Counties' Complaint failed to specify the Counties had 
appealed to the Tax Commission an assessment that failed to meet the 50% or more 
valuation threshold, for which appeal the Commission would lack jurisdiction. (R. 912-
913). The Court then dismissed all remaining causes of action in sweeping fashion for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies without separate analysis as to each claim. (R. 
913-915). However, none of the subject constitutional violations at issue on this appeal 
are umipe or can be decided by the Tax Commission. (R. 1-23, 25-27); TDM, Inc. v. Tax 
Comm 'n, 2004 UT App 433, ~~ 4-5, quoting Nebeker v. State Tax Comm 'n, 2001 UT 74, 
~ 14, 34 P.3d 180 (Utah 2001) and citing Brumley v. Tax Comm 'n., 868 P.2d 796, 799 
(Utah 1993). 
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I. THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE COUNTIES' TENTH 
CAUSE OF ACTION WAS UNRIPE. 
The Counties' claims and causes of action were brought pursuant to the Utah 
Declaratory Judgment Act ("Act"), Utah Code section.§ 78B-6-401. (R.7. at~ 16). Under 
the Act, district courts are granted jurisdiction and wide discretion "to determine any 
question or construction or validity of a statute that affects the rights, status, or other legal 
relations of any person and to declare that person's rights, status, or legal relations under 
the statute." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ~ 15, 66 P.3d 592, 597; see also UTAH CODE 
ANN.§ 78B-6-412 (requiring the Act to be "liberally construed and administered"). In this 
context, the district court may adjudicate the Com1ties' claims if: (i) there is a justiciable 
controversy; (ii) the parties' interests are adverse; (iii) the party seeking relief has a legally 
protectable interest; and (iv) the issues are ripe for judicial determination.2 Id.; see also 
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). "A justiciable controversy authorizing 
entry of a declaratory judgment [under the Act] is one wherein the plaintiff possesses a 
protectable interest at law or in equity and the right to a judgment, and the judgment, when 
pronounced, must be such as would give specific relief." Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 716 
(Utah 1978). 
All the Counties' factual allegations that give rise to their causes of action under the 
Valuation and Allocation Laws were found by the district court to be sufficiently pled to 
2 The Airlines and the State of Utah disputed only the fourth element, i.e., whether the 
Counties' claims presented a justiciable controversy because the challenges are not based 
upon any specific assessment." (R. 282-295; R. 562-563). Therefore, only the ripeness 
requirement for adjudication under the Declaratory Act was addressed by the lower Court 
and subject to this appeal. (R. 911-913). 
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demonstrate a justiciable controversy. (R. 912). The district court, however, found the 
Counties' Review Threshold Law claims umipe because the Complaint "does not contain 
any allegations where the Counties identified a specific instance in which they were denied 
[by the Tax Commission] the opportunity to pursue an appeal of airline assessment." (R. 
912-913). The district court's holding, however, went awry of the Counties' stated 
constitutional challenge. 
For clarity, the Review Threshold Law found at Utah Code section 59-2-1 007(2)(b) 
inherently violates principles of uniformity and equal protection by insulating tax 
assessments from judicial review unless the assessed value falls below the prerequisite 50% 
threshold mandated by the Legislature to invoke the Tax Commission's jurisdiction. UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 59-2-1007(2)(b). Therefore, it is the certainty of the statutory rule's 
deprivation of administrative review that violates the Utah Constitution. 
Put another way, the constitutional violation lies in the fact the Counties are 
prohibited from seeking administrative review of Tax Commission assessments of airline 
property that are below market value or that lack uniformity except in those rare instances 
where the counties contend fair market value is 50% more than the assessed value of the 
prior year's assessment. I d. But depriving the Counties of the ability to challenge the entirety 
of the statutory scheme unless and until it can allege facts to show that the scheme which is 
unconstitutional on its face has also been unconstitutionally applied, smacks of legislative 
overreach. (R. 7 at ~18; R. 20 at ~80-81; R. 27 at ~123-124). But a deprivation of 
constitutional principles evident on the face of an unconstitutional statute occurred and will 
9 
occur, regardless of any affirmative action or inaction by the Commission. It is this statutory 
prerequisite in effect since 2015 itself that deprived the Counties of an opportunity to 
pursue an appeal of a specific airline assessment. 
Contrary to what the Court found, it is not the correlation of a designated "tax 
assessment that has been reduced under the [challenged law] with a resulting loss of 
revenue to the relevant county" that makes the Counties' Tenth Claim ripe for review. (R. 
912, citing Salt Lake Cty. v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 1996)). Rather, ripeness 
occurred when the "conflict over the application of a legal provision sharpened into an 
actual or imminent clash oflegal rights and obligations between the parties thereto." Boyle 
v. Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co., 866 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Redwood 
Gym v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 624 P.2d 1138, 1148 (Utah 1981)). 
Although ripeness requires more than "than a difference of opinion regarding the 
hypothetical application of [a provision] to a situation in which the parties might, at some 
future time, find themselves, where----as here----enforcement of a statute has already 
occurred, or where enforcement is itmninent and certain, the challenge will not be [and 
should not be] rejected on ripeness grounds." !d., quoting Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake 
County Comm'n, 624 P.2d at 1148; see also Reg'! Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 
102, 144 (1974) ("Where the inevitability of the operation of a statute against certain 
individuals is patent, it is irrelevant to the existence of a justiciable controversy that there 
will be a time delay before the disputed provisions will come into effect.") (citing 
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592-593 (1923) and Pierce v. Society of 
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Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925)). Indeed, "one does not have to await the consummations 
of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief .. Ifthe injury is certainly impending that is 
enough." !d. (quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. at 593). 
Notwithstanding these basic legal principles, the district court erroneously relied 
upon Salt Lake County v. Bangerter, supra, to hold the contrary. (R. 912-913). Bangerter 
involved a statutory remedy under the Equalization Act that could be applied only if and 
when invoked by a taxpayer, which was never done. !d. at 385. Accordingly, the Utah 
Supreme Court found "there was no justiciable controversy and consequently, the issues 
between the parties ... not ripe for judicial determination" because the county could not 
show that the remedy had ever been, or would ever be, invoked. !d. at 385-386. 
Here, by contrast, the Review Threshold Law is invoked ab initio and prevents any 
County to appeal valuations that are below the 50% threshold since 2015. (R. 19-20 at 
~~77-82; R. 750-783; R. 803-809). It is the threshold's statutory bar that itself 
demonstrates there is not only a substantial likelihood that a controversy will develop in 
the future, but that actual controversy has already occurred because the county has been 
deprived of its right of redress to assessments that fall short of the statute's percentage 
prerequisite. !d.; Salt Lake County v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d at 385. Ripeness does not require 
a party to file an appeal that is expressly prohibited by the plain language of the statute. 
The clear and express prohibition itself makes the claim against the statute ripe. Absent the 
plain language, appeals could have been filed, but because of the prohibition, that 
opportunity was extinguished. 
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Furthermore, the court's disregard of subsequent factual evidence that showed that 
the Tax Commission, in fact, dismissed four appeals for failing to meet the Review 
Threshold Law was also error when reviewing the claim under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(l). (R. 913). (stating "[a]lthough the Commission dismissed four appeals 
under§ 59-2-1007(2)(b) since the Complaint in this case was filed, the Court agrees with 
the State that this does not fix the deficiencies in the Counties' Complaint.) A court when 
considering a Rule 12(b)(l) motion to dismiss, like here, should consider materials outside 
the pleadings, including supplemented factual allegations to detennine whether any set of 
facts support the cause of action pled. Coombs v. Juice Works Dev., Inc., 2003 UT App 
388, ~ 7, 81 P.3d 769; Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, ~ 20, 40 P.3d 632 (quoting 
Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82, ~ 5, 987 P.2d 36). In fact, the District Court should only 
have dismissed the Complaint "if it clearly appear[ ed] that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his or her claim." Am. W. Bank Members, L.C. v. State, 2014 UT 49, ~7, 
342 P.3d 224 (Utah 2014); Golding, 793 P.2d at 898 ("The grant of a motion for judgment 
on the pleadings is reviewed under the same standard as the grant of a motion to dismiss."). 
On April4, 2018, the Counties provided notice to the district court that days prior-
-on March 28, 20 18--the Tax Commission granted summary judgment and dismissed four 
pending administrative appeals related to taxation of airline property based, in part, upon 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Utah Code Section 59-2-1007 requiring a 50% 
threshold to hear the appeals. (R. 750-783; R. 803-809, and declining to address the 
constitutional question, citing Nebeker v. Utah State Comm 'n, 2001 UT 74, 34 P.3d 180). 
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These additional, subsequent factual developments indisputably confirmed the Counties 
had suffered actual injury and that its claim has never been simply a hypothetical 
application ofthe challenged statute based on undeveloped facts. (R. 803-809.). Rather, the 
injury is patent and the Counties have been and continue to be deprived of any appeal of 
the airline property assessments that fail to meet the unconstitutional, non-uniform 
threshold.3 Id. 
The law should not be applied in a manner that requires the Counties to pursue a 
needlessly time-consuming and wasteful case-by-case challenge to generate an affirmative 
denial by the Tax Commission of a constitutional issue that it cannot decide. This is 
especially true when the Review Threshold Law prevents the challenges.4 Here, the 
3 Consideration of these additional subsequent facts presented in the pleadings does not 
convert the motion under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )(1) into a motion for summary 
judgment and affirmative evidence relating to the basis for the arguments presented therein 
should have been considered. Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82, ~5, 987 P.2d 36 (Utah 1999). 
Additionally, "[a] court may also consider outside documents of which it would be entitled 
to take judicial notice, such as public records." BMBT, LLC v. Miller, 2014 UT App 64, ~,] 
6-7, 322 P.3d 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 2014) (holding that a district court may also consider 
outside documents of which it would be entitled to take judicial notice, such as public 
records). 
4 Although addressing the issue of standing, this court has found such insulation is 
improper. See, e.g., Kimball Condos. Owners Ass 'n v. County Bd. of Equalization, 943 
P.2d, 647 (Utah 1997) ("[w]e note that if the assessor had no right of appeal from board of 
equalization decisions, many decisions would be insulated from review altogether. 
Certainly, taxpayers who successfully contest an assessment would have no reason to 
appeal, if a board of equalization erred in construing constitutional or statutory provisions 
in the taxpayer's favor. In that case, the decision would stand because there would be no 
one who both would and could appeal. Consequently, the constitutional requirements that 
assessments be both uniform and represent fair-market value would be undermined."); see 
also, Kennecott Corp., v. Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d at 455 (stating that "[i]f counties do 
not have standing to challenge underassessments of state-assessed properties, then 
underassessments could be effectively insulated from challenges, which would not likely 
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Review Threshold Law is in force, has been applied, and has real world effects on the 
Counties' right to challenge assessments. (R. 750-783, R. 803-809.) Accordingly, the 
Counties' Tenth Claim is not only ripe for review, but critical for the court to address to 
ensure Utah's constitutional mandates that all property taxpayers are being treated 
uniformly and equally. 
II. DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES OF ALL REMAINING CLAIMS WITHOUT SEPARATE 
ANALYSIS WHETHER ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION APPLIES 
TO EACH INDEPENDENTLY PLED CLAIM WAS ERROR. 
A threshold question central to this appeal is whether a court may grant wholesale 
dismissal of all remaining claims under the doctrine of exhaustion when a party has 
independently pled claims that give rise to purely legal questions that cannot be obviated 
through administrative adjudication and for which adjudication serves no useful purpose. 
The Counties advance it cannot. 
A plaintiff generally has a choice of any remedy cognizable at law or equity and 
may generally plead alternative claims even if based on the same predicate facts. UTAH R. 
CIV. P. 8(a). Indeed, it is undeniable that a plaintiff is entitled to advance inconsistent 
theories in alleging a right to recovery in its Complaint. Id. Challenges to the alleged facts 
and causes of actions may be challenged in whole or part with resulting judgment on fewer 
than all claims asserted. UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b), 12(c); UTAH R. C!V. P. 54(b). 
be made by either a state-assessed property owner, by the Tax Commission (which made 
the underassessment), or by any county-assessed taxpayer.") 
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At the close ofthe pleadings, a party may challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings 
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12( c), including attacking a cause or causes of action 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(c); Cheek v. Iron Cty., 2018 UT 
App 116, ~13, pin ("subject matter jurisdiction goes to the heart of a court's authority to 
hear a case," and as such, "it is not subject to waiver and may be raised at any 
time."( quoting In re adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, ~ 25, 266 P.3d 702)). When 
reviewing the sufficiency of the pleadings and their factual predicate, a court shall consider 
all factual allegations admitted and in favor of the non-moving party [the Counties] and 
determine whether "as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the facts 
alleged [for any claim asserted]." MBNA Am. Bank, NA. v. Williams, 2006 UT App 432, 
~2, 147 P.3d 536 (Utah 2006) (quoting Mountain Am. Credit Union v. McClellan, 854 P.2d 
590, 591 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). The reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable 
interpretation by reading it as a whole and all of its parts in their context "to do substantial 
justice." UTAH R. Crv. P. 8(t); Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray 
Reservation, 2017 UT 75, ~24, 416 P.3d 401 (Utah 2017) ("we construe complaints 'to do 
substantial justice,' often 'disregard[ ing] teclmicalities' and looking at the 'substance,'") 
(quotingUtahR. Civ. P. 8(t) andLangv. Lang, 17 Utah2d 10,403 P.2d 655,657 (Utah 
1965)); see also, MBNA Am. Bank, 2006 UT App 432, ~2 ("judgments on the pleadings are 
'not favored by the courts, and when made[,] great liberality in construing the assailed 
pleading should be allowed."') (quoting Harman v. Yeager, 110 P.2d 352, 353 (Utah 
1941)). 
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Here, the district court dismissed all remaining Counties' causes of actions 
"regarding the Valuation and Allocation Laws" pursuant to Utah Rule Civil Procedure 
12(c) (R. 914-915). In doing so, the Court reasoned in all-embracing fashion that an 
administrative action: (1) "may obviate the need to reach some of the as-applied 
constitutional questions raised by the Counties regarding the Valuation Law"; and (2) that 
it was "not persuaded that exhaustion of available remedies 'serve no useful purpose" 
because "a determination of fair market value and whether the airline property is 
undervalued under the Value and Allocation Laws are factual findings that underlie the 
Counties' constitutional claims." I d. (emphasis added) In its analysis, however, the 
district court cited only to two of the eleven, independent, "as-applied" causes of action to 
support its conclusion that administrative exhaustion was required-the Counties' "as-
applied" Second Claim for Relief (Clear and Convincing Threshold-Fair Market Value) 
and the "as-applied" Seventh Claim for Relief (Unconstitutional Interstate Allocation-
Uniformity). I d. The Ruling and Order is void of any discussion or analysis whether the 
remaining independently pled facial and/or as-applied challenges could be obviated 
through administrative exhaustion or whether administrative findings could be made that 
would be useful to constitutional issue. (See, generally R. 908-916). Where, as here, not 
all claims are subject to exhaustion, this sweeping approach is error.5 See e.g. Nurse & 
s This threshold question has not been previously decided by the Court and is essential to 
resolve confusion among the courts on how to apply the administrative exhaustion doctrine 
and its exceptions when multiple constitutional claims are asserted including pure legal 
threshold questions that cannot be avoided by any turn the case might have talcen in an 
administrative proceeding. 
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Griffin Ins. Agency v. Erie Ins. Group, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4992 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) 
(reversing lower court's dismissal because not all causes of action pled required 
administrative exhaustion); Wilson v. County of Orange, 881 So. 2d 625 (Florida Ct. App. 
2004) (holding that property owners' facial constitutional challenges could not be barred 
by failure to exhaust administrative remedies.). 
In the present case, with the exception of the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth counts 
of the complaint, the dismissal of which the Counties do not appeal, the claims for relief 
are not of the type which are cognizable before the Tax Commission nor do they require 
administrative review subjecting them to dismissal. Indeed, the court "must look to the 
purposes of the doctrine and 'the particular administrative scheme involved' to determine 
if the doctrine is applicable to a particular claim."' Summerhaze Co., L.C. v. FDIC, 2014 
UT 28, ~14, 332 P.3d 908 (Utah 2014) (quoting McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 
193 (1969)). Any wholesale approach to dismissal fails this required standard. Therefore, 
the district court's wholesale approach to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies without conducting a separate analysis as to each independently and alternatively 
pled claim was error. 
III. THE COUNTIES CLAIMS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO 
ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION. 
Administrative exhaustion applies only where the administrative proceeding may 
obviate the need to reach the constitutional question or authorized factual development will 
be useful to better frame the constitutional issues. TDM, Inc. v. Tax Comm 'n, 2004 UT App 
433, ~~ 4-5 (quoting Nebeker v. State Tax Comm 'n, 2001 UT 74, ~ 14, 34 P.3d 180 and 
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citing Brumley v. Tax Comm 'n., 868 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1993)). The purpose of 
administrative exhaustion is to promote judicial economy to prevent premature interference 
with agency processes by a court. Summerhaze Co., 2014 UT 28, ~14 ("One purpose of the 
doctrine is 'the avoidance of premature interruption of the administrative process' where 
the relevant agency 'is created for the purpose of applying a statute in the first instance."') 
(quoting McKart, 395 U.S. at 193). The rationale being to permit an agency to utilize its 
special expertise to correct its own errors and to compile an adequate record that is more 
developed and informed for a more precise determination by the court. Id. This purpose, 
however, rests on the premise that a claim or its factual underpinnings are cognizable for 
the first time in front of an administrative agency. 
Here, however, the district court was not faced with those types of causes of action 
which are cognizable before the Tax Commission. (R. 1-30). The Legislature has 
purposefully retained exclusive jurisdiction of the courts to hear constitutional challenges 
of tax statutes. Mack v. Utah State DOC, 2009 UT 47, ~ 33 ("A district court has subject 
matter jurisdiction over a legal claim unless adjudicative authority for that claim is 
specifically delegated to an administrative agency."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-5-l 02. And 
the Utah Supreme Court has long held that the Tax Commission lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction "to determine or resolve questions of legality or the constitutionality of 
legislative enactments." State Tax Comm 'n v. Wright, 596 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1979) 
(quoting Shea v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 209, 212, 120 P.2d 274, 275 (1941) 
(emphasis added)); see also, Nebeker v. State Tax Comm 'n, 2001 UT 74, ~23, 34 P.3d 180 
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(internal citations omitted). Accordingly, "exhaustion of administrative remedies is not 
[and cannot be] required when the legal questions involved are threshold questions, and 
their determination could not [be] avoided by any turn the case might have taken in [an 
administrative proceeding]." TDM, Inc. v. Tax Comm 'n, 2004 UT App 433, ~ 5 (internal 
citation omitted; alterations in original). 
As discussed below, none of the Counties' claims in this appeal involve 
administrative claims or require administrative determinations that would obviate the 
constitutional issues. Rather, all the claims appealed present purely constitutional 
challenges that remain regardless of a Tax Commission ruling. (R. 1-30). As such, the 
Tax Commission is precluded by law from making factual detenninations related to the 
statutes legality or constitutionality. The claims cannot be avoided and factual development 
of the record cannot prove useful no matter what turn the administrative proceeding may 
take. TDM, Inc. v. Tax Comm 'n, 2004 UT App 433, ~ 5. 
A. The Tax Commission Cannot Avoid the Constitutional Challenges. 
There is no possibility that the administrative proceeding could obviate the 
constitutional challenges. Irrespective of how the Commission rules on the limited Connty-
challenged assessments that are currently pending before it, the unconstitutionality as to 
each of the statutes will remain. 
For example, under the First Claim for Relief, it is the application of the "Clear and 
Convincing Threshold" that itself violates the uniformity clause. (R. 20, ~ 85). The clear 
and convincing threshold applies only to airline property; a preponderance of the evidence 
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standard applies to all other type of personal property. It is the mere statutory establishment 
of a different, separate and higher standard of review for this select type of property that 
belies principles of uniformity and which causes a constitutional violation to occur 
irrespective of whether the Tax Commission finds that the (unconstitutional) clear and 
convincing standard has been met. 
In other words, the mandatory "clear and convincing" standard applies to every 
assessment of airline property every assessment year. The Tax Commission has no other 
option. Therefore, if the Tax Commission finds it is met and other methods should be used, 
it has applied an unconstitutional standard. Ifthe Tax Commission finds it is not met there 
by precluding other methods, it has also applied an unconstitutional standard. 
The same analysis also controls the Counties' challenges to the Review Threshold 
Law and the Allocation Law consisting of a mathematical formula promulgated in Utah 
Code Section 59-2-804 ("the revenue ton miles factor"). (R. 25-26 at "lf"lf 112 - 119). 
Similar to the "Clear and Convincing Threshold" mandate, the Commission has no 
discretion to avoid the 50% threshold mandated by the Legislature as a predicate for 
invoking the Tax Commission's jurisdiction nor application of the mathematical formula 
that fails to capture 100% of fair market value of airline property. !d. These remain true no 
matter what the inputted values are or any subsequent identification or quantification of 
"what portion of airline property [in any given assessment] []is [or is] not being taxed." 
(R. 575). 
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The incorrec1ness of the district court's ruling requiring exhaustion becomes even 
more apparent as it relates to the Counties' remaining dismissed claims at issue in this 
appeal. For example, the application of the 20% discount violates uniformity because no 
matter how it is applied, it is unconstitutional to provide a discount based on the number 
of items owned when that same discount is not offered to other taxpayers who own multiple 
items. See, Board of Equalization v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n ex rei. Benchmark, 864 P .2d 
882, 888 (Utah 1993) (holding that the uniformity clause is violated when a discount is 
offered solely upon the number of property owned). 
The district court, however, accepted cart blanch the State and the Airlines averred 
connection between the Counties' causes of action and a specific assessment or 
assessments. The court found the connection upon an unfounded premise that without a 
"decision by the Commission concerning implementation of the Challenged Statutes and 
of the fair market value of airline aircraft property" it cannot determine the validity of the 
Counties' claims. Such connection is and remains tenuous at best. (R. 574). Rather, the 
Counties' primary challenges are not that the Challenged Laws will never reach fair market 
value in any conceivable circumstance, not even that any particular assessment needs to be 
increased. The challenges are that the standards imposed by statute, on their face, violate 
the constitution even in the unique case where the standard or methodology happens to 
coincide with fair market value. Accordingly, there is simply no question of fair market 
valuation that the Connnission needs to resolve. In fact, the Counties' claims are not 
dependent on any outcome of any specific assessment, cannot be avoided and are properly 
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situated for redress by this Court-the only forum that has the jurisdiction to do so. TDM, 
Inc. v. Tax Comm 'n, 2004 UT App 433, ~ 5; Kennecott Corp., 702 P.2d at 455. Simply, the 
issues remain regardless of any determination or outcome of any administrative review. No 
matter what the Commission does, the constitutional challenges will remain because the 
challenges are based on the plain language of the statutes and the Commission has no 
discretion to change statutory language. 
B. Administrative exhaustion serves no useful purpose. 
In ruling that the Counties' claims require administrative exhaustion, the district 
court also erroneously found that "the record before the Commission will be useful to better 
frame the constitutional claims that may not be obviated by the Commission's 
determinations" (R. 915). In doing so, the Court agreed with Appellees "that the 
determination of fair market value and whether the airline property is undervalued under 
the Valuation and Allocations Laws are factual findings that underlie the Counties' 
constitutional claims." (R. 914-915). 
Findings of fair market value or undervaluation (which are pertinent to a challenge 
that whether a valuation violates the constitutional requirement for fair market value) are 
simply irrelevant to a determination whether the Challenged Laws violate uniformity, equal 
protection, and separation of powers. Because the Counties facially challenge the three 
statutes as unconstitutional, on those grounds, findings of fact will not assist in framing or 
developing the factual issues before the Court. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 
(1987). Indeed, as argued above, none of the Counties' constitutional claims at issue rely 
22 
on any factual findings. (R. 1-30 at~~ 83- 125). In the case of the "Clear and Convincing 
Standard" the Tax Commission must apply it when making the assessments. The same is 
true considering the Counties' challenge regarding the Allocation Laws formulaic 
expression. Again, it is the deficiency in the function of the equation that fails to capture 
100% of taxable property. It is of no significance what numeric values are inputted or 
outputted that determines its unconstitutionality. 
The senselessness of requiring exhaustion in this case, becomes even more clear by 
looking at the Counties' claims concerning the jurisdictional statutes that limit or 
extinguish the Counties' ability to challenge the assessments under the Review Threshold 
Law at Utah Code Section 59-2-1007(2)(b). (R. 27 at~~ 123-124). As alleged in the 
Complaint and briefing, many assessments were precluded from being appealed or not 
appealed because of the 50% undervalue threshold. (R. 19-20 at~~ 77-82; R. R. 27 at~~ 
123-124; R. 803-809). Others that were appealed were done so despite not meeting the 
required threshold and are now dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without 
any factual development. (R.750-783; R. 803-809) (citing and attaching as Exhibit 2 
thereto Property Tax Division's Motion for Summary Judgment in matter Salt Lake County 
v. Property Ta:x Division of the Utah State Ta:x Commission, Southwest Airlines Co., and 
Affected Counties, Appeal No. 17-1161; Property Tax Division's Motion for Summary 
Judgment in matter Salt Lake County v. Property Ta:x Division of the Utah State Ta:x 
Commission, United Continental Holdings, Inc., and Affected Counties, Appeal No. 17-
1162; Property Tax Division's Motion for Smnmary Judgment in matter Salt Lake County 
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v. Property Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, Alaska Air Group, Inc., and 
Affected Counties, Appeal No. 17-1159; Property Tax Division's Motion for Summary 
Judgment in matter Salt Lake County v. Property Tax Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission, American Airlines, Inc., and Affected Counties, Appeal No. 17-
1158).Clearly, the dismissed appeals evidence that no administrative adjudication would 
assist when there was no ability by the Tax Commission to make the findings in the first 
place. (R. 27 at~~ 123-124). 
In other words, there is no administrative remedy to exhaust because the statute 
under challenge prevents administrative adjudication in the first instance. See, e.g. Kimball 
Condos. Owners Ass'n, 943 P.2d at 647 (quoted at length, infra p. 19 n.4); see also 
Kennecott Corp., 799 P.2d at 455 (same). The unconstitutionality of the statutes will 
remain without administrative factual determination, including the unconstitutionality of: 
1. the mandatory imposition and use of a higher and non-unifonn assessment standard 
for a specific industry under Utah Code section 59-2-201(4); 
2. the non-discretionary application of the 50% threshold under Utah Code section 59-
2-1007(2)(b) for the Cmmnission to have subject matter jurisdiction to determine 
appeals; and 
3. the mandatory statutory allocation methodology in Utah Code section 59-2-804 that 
is mathematically flawed to not capture 100% of taxable value. 
The Tax Conm1ission simply lacks subject matter jurisdiction to make findings of 
fact or determinations of the legality or constitutionality of these legislative enactments. 
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State Tax Comm 'n v. Wright, 596 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1979) (quoting Shea v. State Tax 
Commission, 101 Utah 209, 212, 120 P.2d 274, 275 (1941)); see also Nebeker, 2001 UT 
74, ~23, 34 P.3d 180 (internal citations omitted). Any factual findings that could 
conceivably assist in framing or developing the validity of these statutes, therefore, are 
squarely within the province of this Court, not the Tax Commission. Under such 
circumstances as presented here, there is no useful purpose of requiring administrative 
exhaustion. TDM, Inc., 2004 UT App 433, ~ 6 (holding that where the matter is solely 
constitutional challenges with no alternative administrative bases that could resolve the 
issues, the exhaustion of administrative remedies serves no useful purpose.) Accordingly, 
because the Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction to determine the purely 
constitutional issues presented in this matter, no fact finding or determination through 
administrative remedy exhaustion is useful or required. This remains true, regardless of 
how the Tax Commission applies the statutes in any given case. 
CONCLUSION 
For every statute being challenged, there is simply no administrative remedy the 
Tax Commission can provide that will resolve the constitutional challenges. In fact, the 
Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction to address or determine any legality or 
constitutionality of the laws. Asking the Commission to address constitutional challenges 
respecting which it has no authority and cannot resolve serves no purpose; but is wasteful, 
and stymies judicial economy. 
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All ofthe Challenged Laws, including the Review Threshold Law, are in force, have 
been applied, and have had real world effects on the Plaintiffs and taxpayers. The 
controversy over the application of the Review Threshold Law is anything but hypothetical 
and has sharpened into an actual clash oflegal rights and obligations between the Counties 
and State. For these reasons, the district court's Ruling and Order dismissing the Counties' 
First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh causes of action should be 
reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, DUCHESNE 
COUNTY, UINTAH COUNTY, 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, and WEBER 
COUNTY, all political subdivisions of the 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiffs, 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
(Tier 2) 
Case No. ________________________ __ 
000001 
v. The Honorable _________ _ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
Salt Lake County ("Salt Lake"), Duchesne County ("Duchesne"), Uintah County 
("Uintah"), Washington County ("Washington"), and Weber County ("Weber") (collectively, 
"Plaintiff Counties") file this complaint and allege as follows: 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
I. In Utah, taxpayers may know little about how their property tax rates are set each 
year, or by whom, and whether their taxes are fair and proportional to those paid by others. 
Most taxpayers likely understand that properties owned by individual and small business 
taxpayers are valued by locally elected county assessors. Taxpayers may be less likely to 
understand that properties owned by large businesses operating in more than one county-
generally called "Centrally Assessed" properties, see Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201-are valued 
not by locally elected county assessors, but by the State of Utah through the Utah State Tax 
Commission ("State Tax Commission"). These Centrally Assessed entities are generally valued 
using the same fair market value standard applied by county assessors to value local homes and 
small businesses. Although performed by a different entity, i.e., the State rather than local 
governments, annual valuations of Centrally Assessed properties have a direct impact on all 
other property taxpayers, both individuals and small businesses, because any decrease in the 
valuations of, and resulting taxes paid by, Centrally Assessed entities is shifted, by way of the 
annual certified rate for property taxes, to every other taxpayer in the State of Utah. 
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2. Although their own interests may be adversely affected by Centrally Assessed 
valuations, locally assessed taxpayers-i.e., those who pay more when Centrally Assessed 
entities pay less-have no ability themselves to challenge the valuations of Centrally Assessed 
entities. Consequently, for decades counties in Utah monitored Centrally Assessed property 
assessments made by the State Tax Commission and would occasionally challenge those 
assessments in order to protect those counties' local taxpayers. By legislative action in 2015 
(SB165), however, the State of Utah significantly limited the circumstances in which counties 
could bring assessment challenges on their residents' behalf. 
3. In other words, in the zero sum game that is the State of Utah's propetty tax 
system, absent other offsetting factors, when a large Centrally Assessed entity (or, as discussed 
below, an industry of Centrally Assessed entities) receives a reduction in the property taxes they 
must pay through valuations that depmt from fair market value, that entire aJnount is shifted onto 
other taxpayers, including individual and small business taxpayers. Those other, non-Centrally 
Assessed taxpayers are expected to make up the difference without any ability--{)n their own or 
through their most directly accessible local elected officials-to object or to seek administrative 
or judicial review. 
4. Plaintiff Counties bring this action to challenge a series of legislative actions that: 
(i) cause property tax assessments in the airline industry to fall well below fair market value 
(SB157 (2017 General Session)), Ex. 1 hereto); SB237 (2008 General Session), Ex. 2 hereto), 
thus shifting the resulting tax burdens from airlines to other individual or small business 
taxpayers within the State of Utah; and (ii) insulate any below-market valuations of Centrally 
Assessed properties, including the affected airline valuations, from almost any administrative 
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and judicial review-including, in most instances, by the various counties who must rely on 
those valuations and others to collect property taxes for the taxing entities imposing them 
(SB165 (2015 General Session), Ex. 3 hereto). These legislative actions and statutes are 
referred to collectively herein as "Challenged Laws." 
5. The Challenged Laws violate important principles of due process, equal 
protection, uniformity, and fairness. The unfairness to individual and small business taxpayers 
cannot be overstated. For example, if the tax shift from one Centrally Assessed industry is $5 
million per year, then individual and small business taxpayers will collectively pay $5 million 
more, in perpetuity, to make up that difference. 
6. The Challenged Laws violate the Utah State Constitution and United States 
Constitution in that they carve ont one subset of taxpayers and require that those taxpayers' 
property be valued below fair market value by a statutory methodology, and be subject to a 
different evidentiary standard, than any other property in the State of Utah. 
7. The Challenged Laws violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine, because by 
Legislative enactment the laws curtail the ability of the State Tax Commission (an Executive 
Branch agency), through its Property Tax Division ("Division"), to value airlines at their true 
market value-which, indeed, is mandated pursuant to Article XIII, section 2 of the Utah State 
Constitution (see Ex. 4 hereto), which states (emphases added): 
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(1) So that each person and corporation pays a tax in proportion 
to the fair market value of his, her, or its tangible property, 
all tangible property in the State that is not exempt under the 
laws of the United States or under this Constitution shall be: 
(a) assessed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its 
fair market value, to be ascertained as provided by law; 
and 
(b) taxed at a uniform and equal rate. 
Indeed, the Division in 2017 was required by the methodology set forth by the Legislature in 
SB 157 to value airlines at an average of 39% less than what their values would have been using 
2016 methods-for a total loss in airline tax revenues of roughly $5 million. 
8. The Challenged Laws also contravene the "Truth in Taxation" procedures found 
in Utah Code section 59-2-919, in that they effectively raise property tax burdens by Legislative 
enactment without complying with the strict public notice and hearing requirements required by 
State law. As a result, the Challenged Laws increase individual and small business property tax 
burdens while allowing those property owners no real notice and opporttmity to object, and 
leaving affected taxpayers with little opportunity to lobby directly or to remove from office the 
elected officials actually responsible for the tax increase. 
9. This unreasonable and unconstitutional shift of tax burdens challenged by 
Plaintiff Counties here provides a windfall to one Centrally Assessed industry while unfairly 
penalizing the average individual taxpayer or small business owner, who has few if any avenues 
for redress. 
10. Plaintiff Counties, on behalfoftheirtaxpaying constituents, have no redress other 
than to file this action to enjoin enforcement of the offending laws. 
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NATURE OF ACTION 
11. This Complaint seeks declarations that the following statutes violate the Utah 
Constitution: 
a. Unconstitutional Airline Valuation Method. The Amendments to Utah Code 
§ 59-2-201(4) (2017) by the Utah Legislature in Senate Bill157 (see Ex. 1 
hereto), which require the State Tax Commission to assess "Airline Property"' 
using a price guide and discounts; 
b. Unconstitutional Airline Allocation Factor. Utah Code§ 59-2-804 (2017), 
which requires the State Tax Commission to use an interstate allocation factor 
to allocate the value of Airline Property to Utah, and, if applied unifomliy by 
all states, results in properly and value escaping taxation (see SB237, Ex. 2 
hereto); and 
c. Unconstitutional Bar to Administrative Review. Utah Code§ 59-2-
1007(2)(b) (2017), which limits a county's right to appeal an assessment to 
the State Tax Commission for administrative review to those circumstances 
where the county reasonably believes fair market value is 50% greater than 
the assessment or the prior year's assessment (see SB165, Ex. 3 hereto). 
12. Tins Complaint further seeks injunctive relief prohibiting the State Tax 
Commission from applying the Challenged Laws identified above. 
1 The term "Airline Property" includes "all operating property of an airline, air charter service, 




13. Defendant State of Utah is a governmental entity within the United States of 
America authorized tmder an Act of Congress approved on July I 6, 1894, the Enabling Act, and 
by the Utah Constitution of 1895, and as thereinafter amended. 
14. Defendant State of Utah, though its Legislature, enacted the Chaiienged Laws, 
and through its agency, the State Tax Commission, applies the Chaiienged Laws. 
15. Plaintiffs Salt Lake County, Duchesne County, Uintah County, Washington 
County, and Weber County are ail political subdivisions of the State of Utah, and through their 
elected officials, the Assessor, Board of Equalization, Auditor, and Treasurer, they administer, 
assess, and coiiect property taxes. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
16. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78B-6-401(1) to issue 
declaratory judgments. 
17. The District Court has jurisdiction to hear the "legality or constitutionality of tax 
statutes." Kennecott Corp v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 455-56 (Utah 1985) ("Kennecott 
F'). 
18. The District Court has jurisdiction because Utah Code section 59-2-1 007(2)(b) 
restricts the Counties' right to an administrative review of Commission assessments to only those 
rare instances where they contend fair market value is 50% more than the assessed value or the 
prior year's assessment, leaving Plaintiff Counties with no meaningful administrative remedy. 




20. The relief sought by Plaintiff Counties is non-monetary and thus qualifies for Tier 
2 discovery limits under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26( c )(3 ). 
STANDING 
21. All tangible property in the State of Utah, unless exempt by the Utah Constitution, 
is subject to property tax. 
22. Elected county assessors assess all property located within their respective 
counties, except for property assigned by statute to the State Tax Commission for assessment, 
e.g., Centrally Assessed property. 
23. The State Tax Commission has statutory authority to assess operating mining 
property, public utilities, Airline Property, or property that crosses county lines, such as 
telecommunication, pipelines, and rail roads. 
24. The State Tax Commission generally assesses transportation properties, 
telecommunication properties, energy properties, and public utilities using the unitary appraisal 
method. 
25. The State Tax Commission defines "transportation properties" as "the operating 
property of all airlines, air charter services, air contract services, including major and small 
passenger carriers and major and small air frejghters, long haul and short line railroads, and other 
similar properties." Utah Admin. Code, R884-24P-62 (emphasis added) (Ex. 5 hereto). 
26. The unitary appraisal method assesses property at a unit level reflecting the 
highest and best use of the property. In the case of Airline Property, the unit level is often the 
national or international operating unit of an airline. 
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27. The unitary value is allocated to the State of Utah using an interstate allocation 
method resulting in State taxable income. The State taxable value is then apportioned to the tax 
areas within Utah where the property is located. 
28. Once that apportionment occurs, the counties levy property tax on all Centrally 
Assessed property within their tax area, and collect all property taxes levied on that Centrally 
Assessed property, on behalf of taxing entities within their jurisdiction? 
29. For example, in Salt Lake County, the taxing entities levying a property tax on 
Airline Property are Salt Lake County, Salt Lake County School District, Salt Lake City, Salt 
Lake Library, Salt Lake Metropolitan Water District, Salt Lake City Mosquito Abatement 
District, and the Central Water Conservancy District. 
30. In Duchesne County, the taxing entities levying a property tax on Airline Property 
are Duchesne County, Duchesne County School District, Duchesne County Library, Roosevelt 
City, Mosquito Abatement District, Duchesne County Water Conservancy District, Central Utah 
Water, and the Johnson Water District. 
31. In Uintah County, the taxing entities and funds levying a properly tax on Airline 
Property are Central Utah Water Conservancy District, Uintah County (including Local 
Assessing and Collecting and Multi-Cow1ty Assessing and Collecting), Uintah County Mosquito 
Abatement, School Funds (including Uintah County School District, State Charter School Levy, 
and Basic School Levy), Uintah Water Conservancy District, Ashley Valley Water & Sewer 
Improvement District, Vernal City, and Naples City. 
2 The State of Utah does not levy properly taxes except for the State school levy. 
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32. In Washington County, the taxing entities and funds levying a propetty tax on 
Airline Property are St. George City, Washington County Water Conservancy District, 
Washington County (Local Assessing and Collecting, Multi-County Assessing and Collecting, 
General Fund, Washington County Library Operations, General Obligation Bonds), Washington 
County Mosquito Abatement Special Service District, Local School Fund, State School Fund, 
and Charter School Fund. 
33. Last, in Weber County, the taxing entities and funds levying a property tax on 
Airline Property are Ben Lomond Cemetery District, Bona Vista Water District, Central Weber 
Sewer District, Eden Cemetery District, Ogden City, Ogden City School District, Riverdale City, 
South Ogden City, Uintah Highlands Improvement District, Washington Terrace City, Weber-
Morgan Health Department, Weber Area Dispatch 911 and Emergency Services District, Weber 
Basin Water Conservancy District, Weber County, Weber County Library, Weber Fire District, 
Weber Mosquito Abatement District, Weber School District, and West Weber-Taylor Cemetery 
District. 
34. To ensure equal and uniform tax burdens among all taxpayers owning property, 
assessments must reflect fair market value. 
35. The County Boards of Equalization are directed by the Utah Constitution to adjust 
and equalize the valuation and assessment of the real and personal property within the County. 
See Utah Const. art. XIII, § 7 (Ex. 4 hereto). 
36. A shift in property tax burden from Airline Property to other property taxpayers in 
each ofthe Plaintiff Counties, as a result of the Challenged Laws or otherwise, impacts the 
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property tax rates of each County and other taxing entities who levy property taxes in the same 
tax area where Airline Property is located. 
37. Utah Code sections 59-2-201(4) and 59-2-804 cause tax rates to increase. 
38. Utah Code sections 59-2-201(4) and 59-2-804 shift a portion of the tax burden 
from the owners of Airline Property to owners of other property in the same tax areas. 
39. Thus, any assessment on Airline Property below fair market value (see SBI57, 
Ex. 1 hereto) creates a shift in property tax burden from Airline Property to other individual and 
small business taxpayers located in the same tax area. 
40. In addition, any interstate allocation factor that facially fails to allocate all of the 
property and value when uniformly applied (see SB237, Ex. 2 hereto) creates a shift in property 
tax burden from Airline Property to other individual and small business taxpayers located in the 
same tax area. 
41. Assuming all other factors in the property tax process remain constant, including 
the fair market values of the properties involved, sections 59-2-201(4) and 59-2-804 cause 
taxpayers owning Airline Property located in each Plaintiff County to pay less property taxes. 
That means all other taxpayers will pay more property taxes, despite the fact that the fair market 
value of their properties was unchanged. 
42. Plaintiff Counties, as the levying authorities and collecting authorities of property 
taxes from Airline Property assessed by the State Tax Commission, have standing to ensure the 




43. The Counties have standing because the Challenged Laws directly affect their 
property tax revenue. 
44. The Counties have standing because they are best positioned to represent the 
interest of all taxpayers and taxing entities within their jurisdiction. 
45. The Counties have standing because t11e allegations relate to the constitutionality 
of"assessment statutes and assessment methods generally." Kennecott I, 702 P.2d at 455. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
46. "So that each person and corporation pays a tax in proportion to the fair market 
value of his, her, or its tangible property, all tangible property in the State that is not exempt 
under the laws of the United States or under this Constitution shall be: (a) assessed at a uniform 
and equal rate in proportion to its fair market value, to be ascertained as provided by law; and (b) 
taxed at uniform and equal rate." Utah Cons!. att. XIII,§ 2(1) (Ex. 4 hereto). 
47. The term "fair market value" for property tax purposes under the Utah 
Constitution "means that all property shall be valued for the purposes of assessment as near as is 
reasonably practicable, at its full cash value; in oilier words, that the valuation for assessment 
and taxation shall be, as near as reasonably practicable, equal to the cash price for which ilie 
property valued would sell in the open market .... " Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake 
County, 799 P.2d 1156, 1159-60 (Utah 1990) ("Kennecott If') (quoting Cunningham v. Thomas, 
50 P. 615,615-16 (Utah 1897)). 
48. "The hallmarks of these constitutional [Utah Cons!. art. XIII,§ 2(1)] and statutory 
directives [Utah Code§ 59-2-103(1)] are the notions ofunifonnity, equality, and a universal 
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measure of valuation--fair market value." Mt. Ranch Estates v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2004 
UT 86, ~ 12, 100 P.3d 1206. 
Unconstitutional Airline Valuation Method-Utah Code Section 59-2-201(4) (SB157 (2017 
General Session)) 
Legislative History 
49. The State Tax Commission has historically used the traditional measures of fair 
market value-i.e., income approach, cost approach and market approach-to value Airline 
Property. 
50. As background, in 2009, the Legislature passed a similar statute requiring the use 
of price guides, effective for only a two-year period, to allow the State Tax Commission time to 
review and decide on the appropriate methods to value Airline Property for property tax 
purposes. See Senate Bill210 (2009 General Session) (Ex. 6 hereto). 
51. As a result, the State Tax Commission conducted rulemaking hearings and 
considered whether price guides should be used as a method to value Airline Property assessed 
by the Commission. 
52. At the conclusion of those rulemaking hearings, the State Tax Connnission 
determined price guides should not be used as the preferred method to value Airline Property. 
The State Tax Connnission therefore specified by Rule that the preferred methods to value 
Airline Propeliy were the income approach and cost approach, not a price guide. See Utah 
Admin. Code, R884-24P-62 (Ex. 5 hereto). 
53. Despite the Connnission's earlier conclusion, the Utah Legislature in 2017 
amended Section 59-2-201(4) by Senate Bill157 (see Ex. 1 hereto), to prevent the Commission 
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from using these traditional measures of fair market value and to instead require the Commission 
to assess aircraft using the "Airliner Price Guide," or other alternative price guide publication, 
unless the Commission "(i) has clear and convincing evidence that the aircraft values reflected in 
the air craft pricing guide do not reasonably reflect fair market value of the aircraft; and (ii) 
cannot identify an alternative aircraft pricing guide from which the commission may determine 
aircraft value." This change is hereafter referred to as the "Clear and Convincing Threshold." 
54. SB157 also amended Section 59-2-201(4) to require a fleet adjustment as outlined 
in the pricing guide and, if not outlined, a reduction to the "value of each aircraft in the fleet by 
.5% for each aircraft over three aircraft up to a maximum 20% reduction." This change is 
hereafter refened to as the "20% Discount." 
55. The Airliner Price Guide requires sales of one or two aircraft using "Current 
Market Value," sales of three aircraft using Wholesale Values, and sales of four or more aircraft, 
Wholesale Values less .5 % for each aircraft over three aircraft up to a maximum 20% from 
Current Market Value. The Division inte1prets this adjustment to be the "fleet adjustment" 
required by Section 59-2-201(4). 
56. The fiscal note published by the Fiscal Analyst for the Utah Legislature stated that 
changes by SB157 "may shift some portion of the $12 million in property tax burden of airlines 




57. The State Tax Commission's original2016 assessments of the seven major 
passenger airlines3 in Salt Lake County gave I 00% weight to the prefeJTed indicators, the 
income and cost indicators, and zero weight to the market approach using the Airliner Price 
Guide. 
58. The assessments issued by the State Tax Commission for the January 1, 2017, lien 
date for the seven major passenger airlines utilized the SB157-required valuation method, rather 
than the prefeJTed valuation methods used by the State Tax Commission for the 2016 
assessments. This significantly affected the assessed value of Airline Property. For example, 
application of Utah Code section 59-2-201(4), as amended, reduced the 2017 assessed system 
value of one airline from $26.2 billion to less than $14.7 billion (a roughly 44% decrease). 
59. By applying the SB157 methodology rather than applying the methodologies used 
the previous year, the 2017 Utah taxable values for the seven major passenger airlines decreased 
by roughly 39% overall. 
60. Had the State Tax Commission used the prefeJTed valuation methods it used in 
2016 instead of the SB157 methodology, the 2017 Utah taxable values for the seven major 
airlines would be on average 43% higher. 
Valuation Issues with Price Guides 
61. Section 59-2-201(4)(a) defmes the term "aircraft price guide" as "a nationally 
recognized publication that assigns value estimates for individual commercial aircraft that are (i) 
3 Major passenger airlines were selected based upon highest Utah taxable income. 
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identified by year, make, and model and (ii) in average condition typical for the aircraft's type 
and vintage." 
62. For commercial jet powered aircraft, there are principally two national 
publications, i.e., A VITAS and Airliner Price Guide. These publications are only available for a 
substantial fee. For example, in the case of A VITAS, the annual subscription fee is $2,000 for 
"Jet Aircraft Values." 
63. SB 157 does not explain why the Airliner Price Guide was selected in Section 59-
2-201 (4) as the preferred aircraft price guide. (See generally Ex. 1 hereto.) 
64. The State Tax Commission considered the use of the Airliner Price Guide in 
valuation hearing Appeal No. 06-0725 for the aircraft of a passenger airline. (See Ex. 8 hereto.) 
65. Quentin Brasie, the publisher of the Airliner Price Guide, testified in Appeal 06-
0725. (See Ex. 8 hereto at 1[28.) 
66. Mr. Brasie testified that "the Airliner Price Guide is not an appraisal book. You 
would not use that book as a sole basis for conducting an appraisal." (Ex. 8 hereto at 1[33.) 
Another expert witness in that case also criticized the Airliner Price Guide because of its lack of 
transparency, testifYing that an "appraiser should not place total reliance on the work of another 
without adequate disclosure." (Ex. 8 hereto at 1[37.) 
67. The Airliner Price Guide prohibits the use of the 20% discount for "multiple 
aircraft appraisals or fleet appraisals." (Ex. 9 hereto (excerpt, Airliner Price Guide (Winter 
2017)) at 20.) 
68. The State Tax Commission, based in part on the foregoing, "conclude[ d] that it 
[would be] merely coincidental if the values of each individual airplane summed either under the 
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APG [Airliner Price Guide] Retail or APG Wholesale Column plus the book value of the 
nonrnobile assets results in a value near the fair market unitary value valuation of the airline 
itself." (Ex. 8 hereto at~ 42.) 
69. The State Tax Commission therefore found that the Airliner Price Guide "cannot 
be used directly to value any single aircraft in the [subject taxpayer's] fleet, or another fleet for 
that matter."4 (Ex. 8 hereto at p. 19.) 
70. Despite the State Tax Commission's earlier explicit rejection in Appeal No. 06-
0725 of the Airliner Price Guide as an appropriate means to determine value, as well as the State 
Tax Commission's two-year rulemaking process and determination that price guides are not a 
preferred valuation method for airlines, the Legislature in SB 157 nevertheless required the State 
Tax Commission to use such guides, and to further adjust the values downward using the 20% 
Discount, for every airline valuation unless the Clear and Convincing Threshold is met. 
Unconstitutional Airline Allocation Factor-Utah Code Section 59-2-804 (SB237 (2008 
Legislative Session)) 
71. Utah Code section 59-2-804 allocates mobile flight equipment to Utah using two 
factors (fractions) weighted equally, i.e., the "revenue ton miles factor" and the "ground hours 
factor." Utah Code§ 59-2-804(1)(e) and (i). 
4 Even in a non-unitary valuation context, such as the valuation of one commercial jet engine 
aircraft, the use of aircraft price guides is problematic because such guides assume an aircraft in 
an average state, while in reality, the value of an aircraft is determined by the type of jet engine, 
the hours of use on the engines, its placement on the maintenance cycle, and the configuration of 
the seating or cargo arrangements, including flight entertainment equipment. For example, 
commercial passenger jet aircraft are configured based upon the unique needs of an airline, such 
a first class, business class, and economy. Such configurations can impact passenger load and 
flight prices. An average value offered by an aircraft price guide will not recognize the value 
related to the unique configurations. 
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72. The "revenue ton miles factor" is a fraction with the numerator consisting of 
"Utah revenue ton miles" and the denominator consisting of the total of all "airline revenue ton 
miles." Utah Code§ 59-2-804(l)(i). 
73. "Fly over miles," defined as miles flown over a state, but where the aircraft did 
not land or take off from such state, are included in the denominator, but not in the numerator. 
As a result, if the "revenue ton miles factor" was applied uniformly by all taxing jurisdictions, 
the allocations would sum to less than 1 (or 100%) leaving property and value untaxed. 
74. The following example illustrates the unconstitutional allocation factor. Over the 
course of one year, an airline has a total of 10,000 flight miles, including fly over miles, over 
States A, B, C. State A has 3,500 flight miles (excluding fly over miles). State B has 2,500 
flight miles (excluding fly over miles). State C has 1,500 flight miles (excluding fly over 
miles). The revenue ton miles factors for each state under Section 59-2-804 would be calculated 
as follows: 
Interstate Allocation State A State B State C Total 
Factor as a fraction 3,500/10,000 2,500/10,000 1,500/10,000 7,500/10,000 
Factor as a percentage 35% 25% 15% 75% 
Under this example, use of the Section 59-2-804 allocation results in 25% of the taxable property 
and its value not being allocated to aoy taxing jurisdiction, including Utah. 
75. In 2008, in SB237, the Utah Legislature amended Section 59-2-804 to require use 
of the revenue ton miles factor. (See generally Ex. 2 hereto.) 
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76. The fiscal note issued for SB237 showed that "individuals and businesses are 
likely to experience an ongoing shift in propetiy tax liability in counties of the first class with an 
international airpoti of $5.7 million from central assessed to locally assessed property." (Ex. I 0 
hereto (emphases added).) 
Unconstitutional Bar to Administrative Review-Section 59-2-1007(2)(b) (SB165 (2015 
Legislative Session)) 
77. Each county assessor and county Board of Equalization must ensure that all the 
property in that county is assessed at fair market value, in a uniform and equal manner, so that all 
taxpayers share their proportionate tax burden. A county's right to appeal what it believes may 
be an inaccurate valuation by the State Tax Commission of a given Centrally Assessed property 
is a critical tool in ensuring that all taxpayers in that county are being assessed uniformly in 
proportion to the fair market value of their property, which in turn helps protect all county 
taxpayers from having to shoulder a disproportionate share of the tax burden. 
78. Prior to 2015, counties could seek administrative review of Centrally Assessed 
valuations without a value restriction. 
79. The Utah Supreme Court has explained the constitutional imperative that all 
assessments be subject to review (see Kimball Condos. Owners Ass 'n v. County Bd. of 
Equalization, 943 P.2d 642, 647 (Utah 1997)): 
[W]e note that if the assessor had no right of appeal from board of equalization 
decisions, many decisions would be insulated from review altogether. Certainly, 
taxpayers who successfully contest an assessment would have no reason to 
appeal, if a board of equalization erred in construing constitutional or statutory 
provisions in the taxpayer's favor. In that case, the decision would stand because 
there would be no one who both would and could appeal. Consequently, the 
constitutional requirements that assessments be both uniform and represent fair-
market value would be undennined. 
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80. In 2015, however, the Utah Legislature amended section 59-2-1007(2)(b) in 
SB165 (see Ex. 3 hereto) to limit significantly a county's ability to seek administrative review of 
an assessment by the State Tax Commission, allowing an appeal only in those circumstances 
where the county reasonably believes fair market value is 50% greater than the assessment or the 
prior year's assessment. 
81. If an assessment is below fair market value, but not below the 50% threshold of 
Section 59-2-1007(2)(b), only the taxpayer can seek administrative review. A Centrally 
Assessed taxpayer has no incentive to file an appeal for an assessment below fair market value, 
such that assessments below fair market value, but not more than the 50% threshold, will likely 
go unchallenged due to SB165's amendment to section 59-2-1007(2)(b). 
82. All other taxpayers-including those who will bear an increased tax burden 
caused by below fair market value assessments of airline property-have no right to file for 
administrative or judicial review of those assessments. Nor do they have any ability to remove 
from office the non-elected State Tax Commissioners who are responsible for those assessments. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Clear and Convincing Threshold-Uniformity) 
83. Utah Constitution Article XIII, section 2(1) requires that all tangible property be 
assessed and taxed at a unifonn and equal rate in proportion to fair market value. 
84. The Clear and Convincing Threshold requires the State Tax Commission to meet 
a clear and convincing standard to depart from the required methodology of Section 59-2-201(4) 
for arriving at fair market value, while the State Tax Commission and local assessors must only 
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meet a preponderance of the evidence standard in establishing fair market value for all other 
property assessed in the State. 
85. Utah Code section 59-2-201(4) violates the uniformity requirements of Utah 
Constitution Article XIII, section 2(1), both facially and as applied to the 2017 tax assessments, 
by requiring a different evidentiary standard to reach fair market value. 
86. Utah Code section 59-2-201(4) violates the uniformity requirements of Utah 
Constitution Article XIII, section 2(1 ), both facially and as applied to the 2017 tax assessments, 
by causing assessments and tax burdens that are not uniform and equal. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Clear and Convincing Threshold-Fair Market Value) 
87. The Utah Constitution requires that all property assessments reflect fair market 
value. 
88. "The choice of valuation methodology in assessing property is a question of fact 
[and] the resulting determination offair market value is also a question of fact." Salt Lake City 
S. R.R v. State Tax Comm'n, 1999 UT 90, 'l]l3, 987 P.2d 954 (citations omitted). 
89. The Utah Supreme Court has held, "Valuation is an art, not a science. It is a 
function of judgment, not of natural law. [] For example--true market value for purposes of ad 
valorem taxation is always an estimate, always an expression of judgment, always a result built 
on a foundation of suppositions about knowledgeable and willing buyers and sellers endowed 
with money and desire .... " Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 916 P.2d 344, 355 
(Utah 1996); see Rio Algom Corp v. San Juan County, 681 P .2d 184, 192 (Utah 1984)("[Fair] 
market value is at best an approximation."). 
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90. Because fair market value is an approximation, the clear and convincing standard 
is difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy in most complex prope1iy tax valuations. 
91. The Clear and Convincing Threshold prevents a finding of fair market value in all 
instances where a preponderance ofthe evidence requires a methodology other than Section 59-
2-201 ( 4) in order to arrive at fair market value, but the Clear and Convincing Threshold prevents 
that methodology from being used. 
92. Utah Code section 59-2-201(4) facially violates Utah Constitution Article XIII, 
section 2(1) by preventing fair market value due to the Clear and Convincing Threshold. 
93. Utah Code section 59-2-201 ( 4) violates Utah Constitution Article XIII, section 
2( 1) as applied because fair market value is not reached where the preponderance of the evidence 
requires a fair market value finding different than the value arrived at using the required method 
under Section 59-2-201(4). 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(20% Discount-Uniformity) 
94. Utah Code section 59-2-201(4) requires the State Tax Commission to discount the 
value of aircraft based solely upon the number of aircraft owned by the taxpayer, with the 
required discount typically escalating at 0.5% for each aircraft owned after three, up to 20%, i.e., 
the 20% Discount. 
95. Utah law prohibits discounts that are not uniformly applied to all properties 
assessed according to the same method of appraisal. See Bd. ofEqualization v. Utah State Tax 
Comm 'n ex rei Benchmark, 864 P.2d 882, 887 (Utah 1993). 
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96. Utah Code section 59-2-201(4) facially violates Utah Constitution Article XIII, 
section 2( 1) because it applies a different discount depending on the number of aircraft owned. 
For example, an aircraft owned by Taxpayer A, who owns two aircraft, will have a higher value 
under section 59-2-201 ( 4) than the identical aircraft owned by Taxpayer B, who owns four 
aircraft. 
97. Utah Code section 59-2-201( 4) facially violates Utah Constitution Article XIII, 
section 2( 1) because it does not extend the same discount for transitory property assessed by the 
local assessor using a published price guide. 
98. Utah Code section 59-2-201(4) facially violates Utah Constitution Article XIII, 
section 2(1) because it does not extend the same discount to owners of multiple items of property 
other than aircraft. 
99. Utah Code section 59-2-201(4) facially violates Utah Constitution Article XIII, 
section 2( 1) because it does not extend the same discount to owners of multiple transportation 
properties assessed by the State Tax Commission. 
100. Utah Code section 59-2-201(4) facially violates Utah Constitution Article XIII, 
section 2( 1) because it does not extend the same discount to owners of multiple items of 
properties also assessed by the State Tax Commission using the unitary method. 
101. The .State Tax Commission's application of section 59-2-201(4) violates Utah 
Constitution Article XIII, section 2(1) because the discount has been applied only to aircraft and 
has not been applied to other property. 
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FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(20% Discount-FMV) 
102. Utah Code section 59-2-201(4) requires a discount from fair market value of an 
aircraft based upon the number of aircraft owned. 
103. Utah Code section 59-2-201(4)'s 20% Discount does not result in a fair market 
value. 
104. Utah Code section 59-2-201(4), facially and as applied, violates Utah Constitution 
Article XIII, section 2(1) because it does not value property using the fair market value standard. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Improper Delegation of Constitutional Authority) 
I 05. Utah Constitution Atticle XIII, section 6 establishes and empowers the State Tax 
Commission with the authority to make original assessments and to "adjust and equalize the 
valuation and assessment of property among the counties." 
106. Utah Code section59-2-201(4) violates Utah Constitution Article XIII, section 6 
and is facially unconstitutional because it places the assessment and valuation of aircraft for 
property tax purposes within the control of third-party publications rather than within the control 
of the State Tax Commission. 
107. Utah Code section59-2-201(4) as applied by the State Tax Commission is 
unconstitutional because it places the assessment and valuation of aircraft for property tax 
purposes within the control of third-party publications in violation of Utah Constitution Article 
XIII, section 6. 
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SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Violation ofthe Separation of Powers Doctrine) 
108. Utah Constitution Article V, section 1 distributes the power of government into 
three branches of government-the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial-and mandates 
that "no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others," except as 
specifically allowed by the Constitution. 
109. Utah Constitution Article XIII, section 6 establishes and empowers the State Tax 
Commission with the authority to make original assessments and to "adjust and equalize the 
valuation and assessment of property among the counties." 
110. The State Tax Commission is part of the Executive branch of govermnent. 
111. Utah Code section 59-2-201( 4) is an attempt by the Legislature to assess and 
value Airline Property, i.e., to "exercise any functions appertaining to" the Executive Branch, in 
violation of Utah Constitution Article V, section 1. 
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Unconstitutional Interstate Allocation-Uniformity) 
112. Utah Constitution Article XIII, section 2(1) requires all tangible property to be 
assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to fair market value. 
113. The "revenue ton miles factor" set forth in Utah Code section 59-2-804 results in 
an allocation of less than 1 (or 100% ), if applied uniformly by all taxing jurisdictions, which 
leaves property and value untaxed, while all other interstate allocation factors used by the 




114. Utah Code section 59-2-804 facially violates Utah Constitution Article XIII, 
section 2(1) because it excludes property and value through the "revenue ton miles factor," with 
the same exclusion not provided to all other property assessed by the State Tax Commission or 
by county assessors. 
115. The State Tax Commission's application of section 59-2-804 violates Utah 
Constitution Article XIII, section 2(1) because the State Tax Commission has never applied it to 
any property assessed by the State Tax Commission other than Airline Property. 
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Unconstitutional Interstate Allocation-De Facto Exemption) 
116. Utah Constitution Article XIII, section 2(1) requires all tangible property "that is 
not exempt under the laws of the United States or under this Constitution" to be assessed and 
taxed. 
117. There is no constitutional exemption for Airline Property. 
118. The "revenue ton miles factor" of Utah Code section 59-2-804 facially violates 
Utah Constitution Article XIII, section 2(1) because it exempts tangible property from property 
tax without a constitutional exemption. 
119. The State Tax Commission's application of the "revenue ton miles factor" of 
section 59-2-804 violates Utah Constitution Article XIII, section 2(1) because it exempts 
tangible property from property tax without a constitutional exemption. 
NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Unconstitutional Bar to Administrative Review-Open Courts) 
120. Utah Constitution Article I, section 11 provides that "all courts shall be open" and 
"every person shall have a remedy by due course oflaw." 
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121. Utah Code section 59-2-1007(2)(b) limits a county's right to seek administrative 
review of State Tax Commission assessments to only those circumstances where fair market 
value is 50% greater than the assessment or the prior year's assessment. 
122. The limitation on appeal rights by section 59-2-1007(2)(b) facially violates Utah 
Constitution Article I, section 11 by precluding counties, including through an elected county 
assessor or Board of Equalization, from appealing State Tax Commission assessments on behalf 
of those counties' taxpayers who would bear unfair and disproportionate tax burdens in the case 
of assessments that are below fair market value or are not uniform. 
TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Unconstitutional Bar to Administrative Review-Uniformity) 
123. Utah Constitution Article XIII, section 2(1) requires all tangible property to be 
assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate in prop01tion to fair market value. 
124. Utah Code section 59-2-1007(2)(b) facially violates Utah Constitution A1ticle 
XIII, section 2(1) by insulating from administrative or judicial review State Tax Commission 
assessments that are below market value or are non-uniform. 
ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Equal Protection-Uniformity of Laws) 
125. Utah Code sections 59-2-201(4), 59-2-804, and 59-2-1007(2)(b), both facially and 
as applied by the State Tax Connnission, violate Utah Constitution Article I, section 24 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Counties pray for judgment against Defendant State of Utah as 
follows: 
I. An order declaring SB !57's amendment to Section 59-2-20 I ( 4) unconstitutional; 
2. An order declaring the "revenue ton miles factor" of Section 59-2-804 
unconstitutional; 
3. An order declaring Section 59-2-1007(2)(b) unconstitutional; 
4. An order enjoining the State Tax Commission from applying the unconstitutional 
statutes ideotified above; 
5. For the counties' reasonable attorney fees, investigative costs, and court costs as 
allowed by law; and 
6. For all other and further relief, at law and in equity, as the circumstances merit 
and as allowed by law. 
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DATED this 17th day ofJuly, 2017. 
BY: 
SIMGILL 
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office 
Is Darcy M. Goddard 
Darcy M. Goddard 
Timothy Bodily 
Bradley C. Johnson 
Deputy District Attorneys 
Attorneys for Salt Lake County 
STEPHEN FOOTE 
Duchesne County Attorney's Office 
Is by Darcy M. Goddard* 
Jared C. Tingey 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Duchesne County 
G. MARK THOMAS 
Uintah County Attorney's Office 
Is by Darcy M. Goddard* 
Jonathan A. Stearmer 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Uintah County 
BROCK R. BELNAP 
Washington County Attorney's Office 
Is by Darcy M. Goddard* 
Eric W. Clarke 
Brian R. Graf 
Deputy County Attorneys 
Attorneys for Washington County 
CHRISTOPHER F. ALLRED 
Weber County Attomey's Office 
Is by Darcy M. Goddard* 
Courtlan P. Erickson 
Deputy County Attomey 
Attomey for Weber County 
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P.O. Box206 
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Uintah County 
c/o Uintah County Attorney's Office 
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Vernal, Utah 84078 
Washington County 
c/o Washington County Attorney's Office 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, DUCHESNE 
COUNTY, UINTAH COUNTY, 




STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant, 
and 
DELTA AIRLINES, INC.; and SKYWEST, 
INC., 
Intervenor Defendants. 
Before the Court are two motions: 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 170904525 
Judge Kara Pettit 
I) Defendant State of Utah's ("State") October II, 2017 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Su~ject Malter Jurisdiction ("Motion to Dismiss"), and 
2) Intervenor Defendants Delta Air Lines, Inc. and Skywest, Inc.'s ("Airlines") January 
23,2018 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Joinder in the State's Motion to Dismiss 
("Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings") (combined "Motions"). 
The Court heard argument on the Motions on February 20, 2018. Thereafter, the parties 
filed supplemental briefing on the Motions to present their positions as to whether and how 
recent Utah Tax Commission decisions affected their arguments. The Motions were submitted to 
the Court for decision on Aprll24, 2018. Having considered the pleadings, briefing, oral 
argument, relevant law, and for good cause, the Court now rules as follows. 
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BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs Salt Lake County, Duchesne Cotmty, Uintah County, Washington County and 
Weber County ("Counties") filed the Complaint in this action on July 17,2017 to challenge the 
constitutionality of three laws: Utah Code§§ 59-2-201(4); 59-2-804; and 59-2-1007(2)(b). See 
Complaint at 11114-12. 
The first challenged law (''Valuation Law"), enacted in 2017, generally requires the Utah 
State Tax Commission ("Commission") to use an aircraft pricing guide to detennine the fair 
market value of centrally assessed aircraft, unless the Commission has clear and convincing 
evidence that the aircraft values reflected in the pricing guide do not reasonably reflect fair 
market value of the aircraft and cannot identify an alternative guide from which the Commission 
may determine value. Utah Code§§ 59-2-201(4)(b) aod (d). Plaintiffs seek a declaratory 
judgment that this law violates uniformity requirements of Utah Constitution Article XIII, 
section 2(1), both facially and as applied to the 2017 tax assessments, as well as Utah 
Constitution Article 1, section 24 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Complaint n 85-86; 92-93; and 125. Plaintiffs also challenge the constitutionality 
of the portion of this law that requires the Commission to use a fleet adjustment to reflect the 
value of an aircraft fleet that is used as part of the operating property of ao airline. Utah Code§ 
59-2-201 (4)(c). Plaintiffs argue the fleet adjustment provided in§ 59-2-201(4)(c) is 
unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to the 2017 Assessments, because the provision 
prevents uniformity, prevents finding fair mm·ket value, is an unconstitutional delegation of 
authority, aod violates sepm·ation of powers. Complaint n 96-111. 
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The second challenged law ("Allocation Law"), enacted in 2008, provides the method for 
allocating airline property to Utah using two factors: revenue ton miles factor and ground hours 
factor. Utah Code § 59-2-804. Plaintiffs allege the revenue ton miles portion of this law violates 
the Utah Constitution XIII, section 2(1), because it excludes property, but the same exclusion is 
not provided to other property, and because it exempts tangible property from taxation. They 
also seek a declaration that it violates Utah Constitution Article l, section 24 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution both facially and as applied by the Commission. 
Complaint, 125. 
The third challenged law (''Review Threshold Law"), enacted in2015, limits the 
Counties' ability to seek administrative review of central assessments to instances in which the 
CO\mties allege the fair market value is 50% more than the assessed value or the prior year's 
assessment. Utah Code § 59-2-1 007(2)(b ). Plaintiffs complain that this provision violates the 
open comts and uniformity provisions of the Utah State Constitution and the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Complaint,, 120-125. 
The Complaint alleges that the Commission's use of the aircraft pricing guide for the 
January 1, 2017 lien date caused the assessments for the "seven major passenger airlines" to be 
reduced by roughly 39% overall fTom2016, for a total loss in airline tax revenues ofroughly $5 
million. Complaint,'\! 7, 58 and 59. The Complaint does not identify the specific assessments to 
which the Counties are referring, nor does it challenge any particular assessment. As the 
Counties' explained in their memorandum: "Plaintiff Counties' as-applied challenge relies not 
on specific decisions made for specific taxpayers based on specific and unique facts, but instead 
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in [sic] the impact ofSB157 on the 2017 airline assessments industry-wide." Opp. to State 
Motion to Dismiss at 11-12, fn.8 (emphasis in original). 
In2017, administrative appeals were either initiated or joined by Salt Lake County to 
eight of the Property Tax Division's 2017 assessments: American Airlines, Inc. (appeal number 
17-1158), Alaska Air Group, Inc. (17-1159), Southwest Airlines Co. (17-1161), United 
Continental Holdings, Inc. (17-1162), Delta Air Lines, Inc. (17-979), JetBlue Airways Corp. (17-
1160), Frontier Airlines, Inc. (17-1163), and Sky West, Inc. (17-977). On March 28, 2018, 
Administrative Law Judge Phan dismissed four of Salt Lake Collllty's appeals (12-1158, 1159, 
1161 and 1162) because the County did not meet the 50% threshold under Utah Code § 59-2-
1007, and the Commission did not have jurisdiction to decide the constitutional challenge to the 
statute. The County has filed petitions for review of those four cases in the District Court (see 
Case Nos. 180902754, 180902757, 180902758, 180902759). The other four appeals (Delta (17-
979), JetBlue (17-1160), Frontier (17-1163) and Skywest (17-977)) remain pending. 
DISCUSSION 
Two legal issues are presented by the Motions. First, the State and Airlines assert that the 
Counties' Complaint should be dismissed because the challenges to all three laws fail to present 
a justiciable controversy because the challenges are not based upon any specific assessment. 
Second, the Airlines argue that the challenges to the Valuation and Allocation Laws should be 
dismissed because the Counties have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 
I. Justiciability aud Ripeness 
To proceed in a declaratory judgment action, "(I) there must be a justiciable controversy; 
(2) the interests of the parties must be adverse; (3) the parties seeldng relief must have a Legally 
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protectible interest in the controversy; and ( 4) the issues between the parties must be ripe for 
judicial determination." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) (quoting Jenkins v. 
Finlinson, 607 P.2d 289,290 (Utah 1980)). 
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that "[t]o render the constitutionality of[a tax 
law] ripe for adjudication, the Counties must produce a tax assessment that has been . . . redt1ced 
under the [challenged law] with a resulting loss of revenue to the relevant county. In the absence 
of such a reduced assessment, [the court's] hands are tied because a justiciable controversy 
necessarily involves an accmed state of facts as opposed to a hypothetical state of facts." Salt 
Lake.Cty. v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384,385 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978)). In Bangerter, the challenged law had 
not actually been applied to auy tax assessment at the time of suit. Therefore, the Court held 
there was no justiciable controversy ripe for adjudication. 
As distinguished from Bangerter, the Complaint in this case alleges that tl1e Valuation 
and Allocation Laws were in fact applied in 2017 to determine airline assessments, as opposed to 
a hypothetical situation that has not yet arisen. Although the Complaint does not set forth 
specifics of a particular assessment, it alleges that the Commission used the Valuation aud 
Allocation Laws to determine airline assessments in 2017, which resulted in reduced tax revenue 
from airlines. The Court finds the allegations regarding the 2017 airline assessments sufficiently 
demonstrate a justiciable controversy exists with respect to the Valuation and Allocation Laws. 
However, the Complaint does not contain auy allegations regarding the application of the 
Review Threshold Law. For instance, the Complaint does not allege that the Counties attempted 
to appeal au assessment but could not because of the 50% limitation imposed by the Review 
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Threshold Law. Although the Commission dismissed four appeals under § 59-2-1 007(2)(b) 
since the Complaint in this case was filed, the Court agrees with the State that this does not fix 
the deficiencies in the Counties' Complaint. The Complaint does not specifically reference any 
of the dismissed appeals 01' othetwise identify a specific assessment or Commission decision that 
creates a justiciable controversy regarding the Review Threshold Law. See e.g. Complaint ~1 
77-82 and 121-124. 
Because Plaintiffs have not identified a specific instance in which they were denied the 
opportunity to pursue an appeal of an airline assessment under the Review Threshold Law, their 
constitutional claims as to that law are not ripe for adjudication and must be dismissed. Baird v. 
State, 574 P .2d 713, 716 (Utah 1978) ("When it is ascertained that there is no jurisdiction in the 
court because of the absence of a justiciable controversy, then the court can go no fiuther, and its 
immediate duty is to dismiss the action."). 
Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS the State's and Airlines' Motion to Dismiss 
with respect to the Review Threshold Law and DISMISSES the claims regarding the Review 
Threshold Law without prejudice, but DENIES the Motion with respect to the Valuation and 
Allocation Laws. 
II. Failure To Exhaust Administrative Remedies 
Prior to seeking judicial review, pm1ies must exhaust administrative remedies, except 
where "it appears that exhaustion would serve no useful purpose," TDM, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 
2004 UT App 433, ~ 4, 103 P.3d 190 (quoting Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, 
~ 14, 34 P.3d 180). Although the Commission cannot "determine questions oflegality or 
constitutionality of legislative enactments," Tax Comm 'n v. Wright, 596 P .2d 634, 63 6 (Utah 
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1979), the introduction of a constitutional issue does not necessarily avoid the requirement to 
exhaust administrative remedies. See Johnson v. Utah State Ret. Office, 621 P.2d 1234, 1238 
(Utah 1980). "Exhaustion of administrative remedies is still required when the administrative 
proceeding may obviate the need to reach the constitutional question." TDM, Inc. v. Tax 
Comm'n, 2004 UT App 433,, 5, 103 P.3d 190, 191. Moreover, "an administrative proceeding 
may be useful to better frame the issues before the court." !d. 
As discussed above, Plaintiffs present a justiciable controversy because they.allege the 
application of the Valuation and Allocation Laws in 2017 to at least seven major airlines was 
unconstitutional. The four administrative appeals that remain pending as to those 2017 
assessments may obviate the need to reach some of the as-applied constitutional questions raised 
by the Couoties regarding the Valuation Law. For example, the Commission, upon clear and 
convincing evidence, may apply an alternative method for valuation of aircraft. This may 
obviate the constitutional challenges that the clear and convincing evidentiary standard prevents 
the Commission from fmding fair market value and that the valuation/assessment of the aircraft 
was placed in the control of third-party publications. See Johnson v. Utah State Ret. Office, 621 
P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980). 
Additionally, the record before the Commission will be useful to better frame the 
constitutional claims that may not be obviated by the Commission's determinations. TDM, Inc. v. 
Tax Comm'n, 2004 UT App 433,, 5, 103 P.3d 190. The Court agrees with the Airlines that the 
determination of fair market value and whether the airline property is undervalued under the 
Valuation and Allocation Laws are factual findings that uoderlie the Couoties' constitutional 
claims. The Commission's findings in the administrative appeals will be useful to frame the 
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constitutional claims, and inconsistent findings could result if both the Commission and this 
Court rendered factual findings regarding fair market value of the airlines' property in 
simultaneous proceedings. Similarly, the Commission will make findings regarding allocations 
using the revenue ton miles factor that will be useful to frame the constitutional claims regarding 
the Allocation Law. The Court is not persuaded that exhaustion of available remedies "serve no 
useful purpose." TDM, Inc., 2004 UT App 433,1 4. 
Consequently, the Court GRANTS the Airlines' Motion and DISMISSES the Counties' 
claims regarding the Valuation and Allocation Laws without prejudice for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies. 
ORDER 
For the reasons stated in this Ruling and Order, this action is dismissed without prejudice. 
DATEDthis~yof__gi..--t~- 2018. 
BY THE COUR':fA'_.......,_ 
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59-2-1007 Objection to assessment by commission-- Application-- Contents of application 
--Amending an application --Information provided by the commission --Hearings --
Appeals. 
(1) 
(a) Subject to the other provisions of this section, if the owner of property assessed by the 
commission objects to the assessment, the owner may apply to the commission for a hearing 
on the objection on or before the later of: 
(i) August 1; or 
(ii) 90 days after the day on which the commission mails the notice of assessment in 
accordance with Section 59-2-201. 
(b) The commission shall allow an owner that meets the requirements of Subsection (1 )(a) to be 
a party at a hearing under this section. 
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this section, a county that objects to the assessment of 
property assessed by the commission may apply to the commission for a hearing on the 
objection: 
(a) for an assessment with respect to which the owner has applied to the commission for a 
hearing on the objection under Subsection (1 ), if the county applies to the commission to 
become a party to the hearing on the objection no later than 60 days after the day on which 
the owner applied to the commission for the hearing on the objection; or 
(b) for an assessment with respect to which the owner has not applied to the commission for a 
hearing on the objection under Subsection (1 ), if the county: 
(i) reasonably believes that the commission should have assessed the property for the current 
calendar year at a fair market value that is at least the lesser of an amount that is: 
(A) 50% greater than the value at which the commission is assessing the property for the 
current calendar year; or 
(B) 50% greater than the value at which the commission assessed the property for the prior 
calendar year; and 
(ii) applies to the commission for a hearing on the objection no later than 60 days after the last 
day on which the owner could have applied to the commission for a hearing on the objection 
under Subsection (1 ). 
(3) Before a county may apply to the commission for a hearing under this section on an objection 
to an assessment, a majority of the members of the county legislative body shall approve filing 
an application under this section. 
(4) 
(a) The commission shall allow a county that meets the requirements of Subsections (2) and (3) 
to be a party at a hearing under this section. 
(b) The commission shall allow an owner to be a party at a hearing under this section on an 
objection to an assessment a county files in accordance with Subsection (2)(b). 
(5) An owner or a county shall include in an application under this section: 
(a) a written statement: 
(i) setting forth the known facts and legal basis supporting a different fair market value than the 
value assessed by the commission; and 
(ii) for an assessment described in Subsection (2)(b), establishing the county's reasonable 
belief that the commission should have assessed the property for the current calendar year 
at a fair market value that is at least the lesser of an amount that is: 
(A) 50% greater than the value at which the commission is assessing the property for the 
current calendar year; or 
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(B) 50% greater than the value at which the commission assessed the property for the prior 
calendar year; and 
(b) the owner's or county's estimate of the fair market value of the property. 
(6) 
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(b), an owner or a county assessor may amend an 
estimate on an application under this section of the fair market value of the property prior to 
the hearing as provided by rule. 
(b) A county may not amend the fair market value of property under this Subsection (6) to equal 
an amount that is less than the lesser of: 
(i) the value at which the commission is assessing the property for the current calendar year 
plus 50%; or 
(ii) the value at which the commission assessed the property for the prior calendar year plus 
50%. 
(c) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the 
commission may make rules governing the procedures for amending an estimate of fair 
market value under this Subsection (6). 
(7) In applying to the commission for a hearing on an objection under this section: 
(a) a county may estimate the fair market value of the property using a valuation methodology the 
county considers to be appropriate, regardless of: 
(i) the valuation methodology used previously in valuing the property; or 
(ii) the valuation methodology an owner asserts; and 
(b) an owner may estimate the fair market value of the property using a valuation methodology 
the owner considers to be appropriate, regardless of: 
(8) 
(i) the valuation methodology used previously in valuing the property; or 
(ii) the valuation methodology a county asserts. 
(a) An owner who applies to the commission for a hearing in accordance with Subsection (1) 
shall, for the property for which the owner objects to the commission's assessment, file a copy 
of the application with the county auditor of each county in which the property is located. 
(b) A county auditor who receives a copy of an application in accordance with Subsection (8)(a) 
(9) 
shall provide a copy of the application to the county: 
(i) assessor; 
(ii) attorney; 
(iii) legislative body; and 
(iv) treasurer. 
(a) Upon request, the commission shall provide to a nonprofit organization that represents 
counties in the state the following information regarding an appeal filed under this section: 
(i) the name of the property owner filing the appeal; 
(ii) each year at issue in the appeal; 
(iii) the value assessed by the commission for the property that is the subject of the appeal; and 
(iv) the owner's estimate of value for the property that is the subject of the appeal as submitted 
under Subsection (5)(b). 
(b) 
(i) Except as provided in Subsection (9)(b)(ii), a nonprofit organization may not disclose the 
information described in Subsection (9)(a)(iv). 
(ii) A nonprofit organization may disclose information described in Subsection (9)(a)(iv) to an 




(a) On or before November 15, the commission shall conduct a scheduling conference with all 
parties to a hearing under this section. 
(b) At the scheduling conference under Subsection (10)(a), the commission shall establish dates 
for: 
(i) the completion of discovery; 
(ii) the filing of prehearing motions; and 
(iii) conducting a hearing on the objection to the assessment. 
(11) 
(a) The commission shall issue a written decision no later than 120 days after the later of the day 
on which: 
(i) the commission completes the hearing under this section; or 
(ii) the parties submit all posthearing briefs. 
(b) If the commission does not issue a written decision on an objection to an assessment under 
this section within a two-year period after the date an application under this section is filed, 
the objection is considered to be denied, unless the parties stipulate to a different time period 
for resolving the objection. 
(c) A party may appeal to the district court in accordance with Section 59-1-601 within 30 days 
after the day on which an objection is considered to be denied. 
(12) At the hearing on an objection under this section, the commission may increase, lower, or 
sustain the assessment if: 
(a) the commission finds an error in the assessment; or 
(b) the commission determines that increasing, lowering, or sustaining the assessment is 
necessary to equalize the assessment with other similarly assessed property. 
(13) 
(a) The commission shall send notice of a commission action under Subsection (12) to a county 
auditor if: 
(i) the commission proposes to adjust an assessment the commission made in accordance with 
Section 59-2-201; 
(ii) the county's tax revenues may be affected by the commission's decision; and 
(iii) the county is not a party to the hearing under this section. 
(b) The written notice described in Subsection (13)(a): 
(i) may be sent by: 
(A) any form of electronic communication; 
(B) first class mail; or 
(C) private carrier; and 
(ii) shall request the county to show good cause wliy the commission should not adjust the 
assessment by requesting the county to provide to the commission a written statement 
setting forth the known facts and legal basis for not adjusting the assessment within 30 days 
after the day on which the commission sends the written notice. 
(c) If a county provides a written statement described in Subsection (13){b) to the commission, 
the commission shall: 
(i) hold a hearing or take other appropriate action to consider the good cause the county 
provides in the written statement; and 
(ii) issue a written decision increasing, lowering, or sustaining the assessment. 
{d) If a county does not provide a written statement described in Subsection (13)(b) to the 
commission within 30 days after the day on which the commission sends the notice described 
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in Subsection (13)(a), the commission shall adjust the assessment and send a copy of the 
commission's written decision to the county. 
(14) Subsection (13) does not limit the rights of a county as provided in Subsections (2) and (4)(a). 
(15) 
(a) On or before the November 2018 interim meeting, the Revenue and Taxation Interim 
Committee shall study the process for a county to object to an assessment of property 
assessed by the commission. 
(b) As part of the study required by Subsection (15)(a), the Revenue and Taxation Interim 
Committee shall determine whether to draft legislation to modify the process for a county to 
object to an assessment of property assessed by the commission. 




59-2-201 Assessment by commission -- Determination of value of mining property--
Determination of value of aircraft-- Notification of assessment-- Local assessment of 
property assessed by the unitary method --Commission may consult with county. 
(1) 
(a) By May 1 of each year, the following property, unless otherwise exempt under the Utah 
Constitution or under Part 11, Exemptions, Deferrals, and Abatements, shall be assessed by 
the commission at 100% of fair market value, as valued on January 1, in accordance with this 
chapter: 
(i) except as provided in Subsection (2), all property that operates as a unit across county lines, 
if the values must be apportioned among more than one county or state; 
(ii) all property of public utilities; 
(iii) all operating property of an airline, air charter service, and air contract service; 
(iv) all geothermal fluids and geothermal resources; 
(v) all mines and mining claims except in cases, as determined by the commission, where the 
mining claims are used for other than mining purposes, in which case the value of mining 
claims used for other than mining purposes shall be assessed by the assessor of the county 
in which the mining claims are located; and 
(vi) all machinery used in mining, all property or surface improvements upon or appurtenant 
to mines or mining claims. For the purposes of assessment and taxation, all processing 
plants, mills, reduction works, and smelters that are primarily used by the owner of a mine 
or mining claim for processing, reducing, or smelting minerals taken from a mine or mining 
claim shall be considered appurtenant to that mine or mining claim, regardless of actual 
location. 
(b) 
(i) For purposes of Subsection (1 )(a)(iii), operating property of an air charter service does not 
include an aircraft that is: 
(A) used by the air charter service for air charter; and 
(B) owned by a person other than the air charter service. 
(ii) For purposes of this Subsection (1 )(b): 
(A) "person" means a natural person, individual, corporation, organization, or other legal 
entity; and 
(B) a person does not qualify as a person other than the air charter service as described in 
Subsection (1 )(b)(i)(B) if the person is: 
(I) a principal, owner, or member of the air charter service; or 
(II) a legal entity that has a principal, owner, or member of the air charter service as a 
principal, owner, or member of the legal entity. 
(2) The commission shall assess and collect property tax on state-assessed commercial vehicles 
at the time of original registration or annual renewal. 
(a) The commission shall assess and collect property tax annually on state-assessed commercial 
vehicles that are registered pursuant to Section 41-1a-222 or 41-1a-228. 
(b) State-assessed commercial vehicles brought into the state that are required to be registered 
in Utah shall, as a condition of registration, be subject to ad valorem tax unless all property 
taxes or fees imposed by the state of origin have been paid for the current calendar year. 
(c) Real property, improvements, equipment, fixtures, or other personal property in this state 
owned by the company shall be assessed separately by the local county assessor. 
(d) The commission shall adjust the value of state-assessed commercial vehicles as necessary 




apply the same adjustment to any personal property, real property, or improvements owned 
by the company and used directly and exclusively in their commercial vehicle activities. 
(a) The method for determining the fair market value of productive mining property is the 
capitalized net revenue method or any other valuation method the commission believes, or 
the taxpayer demonstrates to the commission's satisfaction, to be reasonably determinative of 
the fair market value of the mining property. 
(b) The commission shall determine the rate of capitalization applicable to mines, consistent with 
a fair rate of return expected by an investor in light of that industry's current market, financial, 
and economic conditions. 
(c) In no event may the fair market value of the mining property be less than the fair market value 
of the land, improvements, and tangible personal property upon or appurtenant to the mining 
property. 
(4) 
(a) As used in this Subsection (4), "aircraft pricing guide" means a nationally recognized 
publication that assigns value estimates for individual commercial aircraft that are: 
(i) identified by year, make, and model; and 
(ii) in average condition typical for the aircraft's type and vintage. 
(b) 
(i) Except as provided in Subsection (4 )(d), the commission shall use an aircraft pricing guide, 
adjusted as provided in Subsection (4)(c), to determine the fair market value of aircraft 
assessed under this part. 
(ii) The commission shall use the Airliner Price Guide as the aircraft pricing guide, except that: 
(c) 
(A) if the Airliner Price Guide is no longer published or the commission determines that 
another aircraft pricing guide more reasonably reflects the fair market value of aircraft, 
the commission, after consulting with the airlines operating in the state, shall select an 
alternative aircraft pricing guide; 
(B) if an aircraft is not listed in the Airliner Price Guide, the commission shall use the Aircraft 
Bluebook Price Digest as the aircraft pricing guide; and 
(C) if the Aircraft Bluebook Price Digest is no longer published or the commission determines 
that another aircraft pricing guide more reasonably reflects the fair market value of aircraft, 
the commission, after consulting with the airlines operating in the state, shall select an 
alternative aircraft pricing guide. 
(i) To reflect the value of an aircraft fleet that is used as part of the operating property of an 
airline, air charter service, or air contract service, the fair market value of the aircraft shall 
include a fleet adjustment as provided in this Subsection (4)(c). 
(ii) If the aircraft pricing guide provides a method for making a fleet adjustment, the commission 
shall use the method described in the aircraft pricing guide. 
(iii) If the aircraft pricing guide does not provide a method for making a fleet adjustment, the 
commission shall make a fleet adjustment by reducing the aircraft pricing guide value of 
each aircraft in the fleet by .5% for each aircraft over three aircraft up to a maximum 20% 
reduction. 
(d) The commission may use an alternative method for valuing aircraft of an airline, air charter 
service, or air contract service if the commission: 
(i) has clear and convincing evidence that the aircraft values reflected in the aircraft pricing 
guide do not reasonably reflect fair market value of the aircraft; and 
Page2 
Utah Code 
(ii) cannot identify an alternative aircraft pricing guide from which the commission may 
determine aircraft value. 
(5) Immediately following the assessment, the commission shall send, by certified mail, notice of 
the assessment to the owner or operator of the assessed property and the assessor of the 
county in which the property is located. 
(6) The commission may consult with a county in valuing property in accordance with this part. 
(7) The local county assessor shall separately assess property that is assessed by the unitary 
method if the commission determines that the property: 
(a) is not necessary to the conduct of the business; and 
(b) does not contribute to the income of the business. 




59-2-804 Interstate allocation of mobile flight equipment. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Aircraft type" means a particular model of aircraft as designated by the manufacturer of the 
aircraft. 
(b) "Airline ground hours calculation" means an amount equal to the product of: 
(i) the total number of hours aircraft owned or operated by an airline are on the ground, 
calculated by aircraft type; and 
(ii) the cost percentage. 
(c) "Airline revenue ton miles" means, for an airline, the total revenue ton miles during the 
calendar year that immediately precedes the January 1 described in Section 59-2-103. 
(d) "Cost percentage" means a fraction, calculated by aircraft type, the numerator of which is the 
airline's average cost of the aircraft type and the denominator of which is the airline's average 
cost of the aircraft type: 
(i) owned or operated by the airline; and 
(ii) that has the lowest average cost. 
(e) "Ground hours factor" means the product of: 
(i) a fraction, the numerator of which is the Utah ground hours calculation and the denominator 
of which is the airline ground hours calculation; and 
(ii) .50. 
(f) 
(i) Except as provided in Subsection (1 )(f)(ii), "mobile flight equipment" is as defined in Section 
59-2-102. 
(ii) "Mobile flight equipment" does not include tangible personal property described in 
Subsection 59-2-102(27) owned by an: 
(A) air charter service; or 
(B) air contract service. 
(g) "Mobile flight equipment allocation factor" means the sum of: 
(i) the ground hours factor; and 
(ii) the revenue ton miles factor. 
(h) "Revenue ton miles" is determined in accordance with 14 C.F.R. Part 241. 
(i) "Revenue ton miles factor" means the product of: 
(i) a fraction, the numerator of which is the Utah revenue ton miles and the denominator of 
which is the airline revenue ton miles; and 
(ii) .50. 
U) "Utah ground hours calculation" means an amount equal to the product of: 
(i) the total number of hours aircraft owned or operated by an airline are on the ground in this 
state, calculated by aircraft type; and 
(ii) the cost percentage. 
(k) "Utah revenue ton miles" means, for an airline, the total revenue ton miles within the borders 
of this state: 
(i) during the calendar year that immediately precedes the January 1 described in Section 
59-2-103; and 
(ii) from flight stages that originate or terminate in this state. 
(2) For purposes of the assessment of an airline's mobile flight equipment by the commission, a 
portion of the value of the airline's mobile flight equipment shall be allocated to the state by 
calculating the product of: 
(a) the total value of the mobile flight equipment; and 
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(b) the mobile flight equipment allocation factor. 




Article I, Section 24 [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
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Article V, Section 1 [Three departments of government.] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the 
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions 
appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
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Article XIII, Section 2 [Property tax.] 
(1) So that each person and corporation pays a tax in proportion to the fair market value of his, her, 
or its tangible property, all tangible property in the State that is not exempt under the laws of the 
United States or under this Constitution shall be: 
(a) assessed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its fair market value, to be ascertained 
as provided by law; and 
(b) taxed at a uniform and equal rate. 
(2) Each corporation and person in the State or doing business in the State is subject to taxation 
on the tangible property owned or used by the corporation or person within the boundaries of 
the State or local authority levying the tax. 
(3) The Legislature may provide by statute that land used for agricultural purposes be assessed 
based on its value for agricultural use. 
(4) The Legislature may by statute determine the manner and extent of taxing livestock. 
(5) The Legislature may by statute determine the manner and extent of taxing or exempting 
intangible property, except that any property tax on intangible property may not exceed .005 of 
its fair market value. If any intangible property is taxed under the property tax, the income from 
that property may not also be taxed. 
(6) Tangible personal property required by law to be registered with the State before it is used on 
a public highway or waterway, on public land, or in the air may be exempted from property tax 
by statute. If the Legislature exempts tangible personal property from property tax under this 
Subsection (6), it shall provide for the payment of uniform statewide fees or uniform statewide 
rates of assessment or taxation on that property in lieu of the property tax. The fair market 
value of any property exempted under this Subsection (6) shall be considered part of the State 
tax base for determining the debt limitation under Article XIV. 
Page 1 
Utah Constitution 
Article XIII, Section 6 [State Tax Commission.] 
(1) There shall be a State Tax Commission consisting of four members, not more than two of 
whom may belong to the same political party. 
(2) With the consent of the Senate, the Governor shall appoint the members of the State Tax 
Commission for such terms as may be provided by statute. 
(3) The State Tax Commission shall: 
(a) administer and supervise the State's tax laws; 
(b) assess mines and public utilities and have such other powers of original assessment as the 
Legislature may provide by statute; 
(c) adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment of property among the counties; 
(d) as the Legislature provides by statute, review proposed bond issues, revise local tax levies, 
and equalize the assessment and valuation of property within the counties; and 
(e) have other powers as may be provided by statute. 
(4) Notwithstanding the powers granted to the State Tax Commission in this Constitution, the 
Legislature may by statute authorize any court established under Article VIII to adjudicate, 
review, reconsider, or redetermine any matter decided by the State Tax Commission relating to 
revenue and taxation. 
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USCS Const. Amend. 14, USCS Const. Amend. 14, § 1 
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United States Code Service · Constitution of the United States > CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA > AMENDMENTS > AMENDMENT 14 
Sec. 1. [Citizens of the United States.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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